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Abstract: This report details the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Access 5 
Project Office Cooperative Collision Avoidance (CCA) Technology Demonstration for unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS) conducted from 21 to 28 September 2005.  The test platform chosen for the demonstration 
was the Proteus Optionally Piloted Vehicle operated by Scaled Composites, LLC, flown out of the 
Mojave Airport, Mojave, CA.  A single intruder aircraft, a NASA Gulf stream III, was used during the 
demonstration to execute a series of near-collision encounter scenarios. Both aircraft were equipped with 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System-II (TCAS-II) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Broadcast (ADS-B) systems.     
 
The objective of this demonstration was to collect flight data to support validation efforts for the Access 5 
CCA Work Package Performance Simulation and Systems Integration Laboratory (SIL).  Correlation of 
the flight data with results obtained from the performance simulation serves as the basis for the simulation 
validation.  A similar effort uses the flight data to validate the SIL architecture that contains the same 
sensor hardware that was used during the flight demonstration.  
 
 
Status:  
 
SEIT-Approved 
 
 
 
Limitations on use:  This document represents the analysis of the Access 5 Collision Avoidance Work 
Package.  It contains analysis of flight demonstration data collected to validate the CCA Performance 
Simulation only.  Unfortunately the project ended before the validation of the Performance Simulation 
could be completed.  This validated simulation was intended to be the source for deriving the CCA 
Performance Guidelines found in the CCA Functional Requirements Document (CCA002).   
 
The flight demonstration utilized existing systems and Access 5-developed components in a test-
expedient architecture and, as such, should not be used to infer conclusions about the applicability of 
either TCAS-II or ADS-B as an element of a UAS collision avoidance system. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20080017398 2019-08-30T04:23:53+00:00Z
 The following document was prepared by a collaborative team through the noted work package.  This was a funded 
effort under the Access 5 Project 
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Cooperative Collision Avoidance (CCA) Tech Demonstration Data 
Analysis Report 
 
 
Executive Summary 
The Access 5 Project Office sponsored a cooperative collision avoidance (CCA) technology 
demonstration for unmanned aircraft cooperative collision avoidance systems from September 21 
to September 28, 2005. The objective of these flights was to collect data to be analyzed by the 
Cooperative Collision Avoidance Work Package and used to refine and validate the performance 
simulation and functional requirements that were previously developed.   
The test platform selected was the Proteus Optionally Piloted Vehicle (OPV) operated by Scaled 
Composites, LLC from the Mojave Airport in Mojave, California.  Proteus was manned by two 
on-board pilots, but was controlled by a ground pilot in the Air Vehicle Control Station (AVCS) 
during test points.  For this demonstration, Proteus was equipped with both Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System-II (TCAS-II) cooperative collision sensors and Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) situational awareness enhancement technology.  A 
single intruder aircraft used during the demonstration, a NASA Gulfstream III (G-III) operating 
from Edward AFB, CA, was also equipped with TCAS-II and ADS-B. 
Following the series of six flights, the CCA Work Package processed and analyzed aircraft and 
CCA sensor system data to characterize the CCA systems in terms of data latency, missed error 
rates, pilot response, and sensor position error.  Selected data parameters recorded on both 
aircraft and the AVCS were extracted from over 9 GB of data collected during the flights and 
stored in MS Access databases for analysis. 
The CCA Work Package used the data to refine and validate the CCA Performance Simulation.  
Selected flight test runs were replicated in the simulation and CCA system component models 
adjusted to ensure that aircraft flight characteristics and sensor performance accurately matched 
data collected in flight.  Validation of system characteristics was performed to the extent 
possible, given accuracy and availability of the data.  Extensive use of the simulation will be 
necessary to provide a body of evidence supporting values for many of the performance 
specifications detailed in the CCA Functional Requirements Document.  
The CCA Performance Simulation is available for limited distribution as deliverable CCA008-
Rev2.  The Functional Requirements document is available for unlimited distribution as 
deliverable CCA002-Rev6.  The sections that follow constitute the CCA Technology 
Demonstration Data Analysis Report, deliverable CCA010.  This document presents the CCA 
perspective of the technology demonstration, data processing and analysis, simulation validation, 
lessons learned, and conclusions.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Document Organization 
This document is organized into the following sections and appendices: 
Section 1 – Introduction.  States the background and purpose of the technology 
demonstration and its role in the Access 5 program. 
Section 2  – Technology Demonstration Architecture.  Lists the hardware and software 
utilized in the testing process and identifies the data collection points. 
Section 3 – Simulation Architecture.  Describes the performance simulation and Systems 
Integration Lab (SIL).  These are both being validated by the technology demonstration. 
Section 4 – Test Conduct.  Explains how the test matrix was developed and used to gather 
the flight test data.  Also summarizes the sorties and any issues that arose during the 
technology demonstration. 
Section 5 -- Data Processing.  Describes the methods developed and employed to process 
the recorded data, as well as assessments of the data recorded at each point. 
Section 6 – Analysis and Results.  Discusses the data processing methodology and timeline 
issues, and presents a refined view of the flight test data.  Analyzes the sensor errors, 
latency issues, and validation of the performance simulation and SIL. 
Section 7 – Summary and Conclusions.  Provides a recap of the principal results and issues 
arising from the technology demonstration, as well as lessons learned for future UAS 
collision avoidance investigations. 
Section 8 – Definitions and Acronyms.  A glossary of terms used throughout the report. 
Appendix A – CCA Objectives to Data Analyses Mapping 
Appendix B – Data Files and Parameters   
Appendix C – Processed Data Structures   
Appendix D – Data Analysis Plots, ‘Truth’ Position   
Appendix E – Data Analysis Plots, TCAS Track 
Appendix F – Sensor Timelines   
Appendix G – Simulation Validation Plots 
1.2 Background 
Access 5 is a national program sponsored by NASA with participation by aerospace industry 
members, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Department of Defense (DOD).  
Headquarters for this effort is the NASA Access 5 Project Office, located at NASA Dryden 
Flight Research Center in Edwards, CA.  The goal is to enable civil High Altitude Long 
Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to routinely operate in the National 
Airspace System (NAS) as safely as manned aircraft while minimizing any adverse impact on 
the existing system.  Further objectives of Access 5 include assisting in the development of UAS 
policies and procedures, demonstrating that all requirements are reasonable and achievable, and 
identifying infrastructure to promote a robust civil market for HALE UAS. 
Operation of a UAS in the NAS requires that the aircraft perform a set of functions that not only 
meet mission objectives, but also provide a level of safety equivalent to that of current manned 
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aircraft operations. A critical element of these safety functions is to sense and avoid other traffic 
in the airspace. Manned aircraft operating in the NAS have a low risk of mid air collision due to 
a multilayered approach to collision avoidance. These layers consist of operational procedures, 
Air Traffic Control services, on-board collision avoidance systems, and see and avoid as the last 
level.  
1.3 CCA Functional Requirements  
To help determine the policies, procedures, and requirements for safe, routine UAS operation in 
the NAS, the CCA work package established a comprehensive set of functional requirements and 
performance guidelines for a HALE UAS that is capable of reliably detecting cooperative 
aircraft and providing the necessary situational awareness information and maneuver guidance to 
a UAS pilot.  These requirements are captured in the CA Functional Requirements Document 
(CCA002_Functional Requirements Document_Rev6), which is available for unlimited 
distribution. 
1.4 CCA Simulation  
Three sources have been considered to support evaluation and validation of the CCA functional 
requirements: existing data, simulation, and flight test.  The existing data sources that have been 
evaluated have been found to be missing elements of the system architecture or lacking essential 
parameter detail in the data that was recorded.  Many previous tests addressing collision 
avoidance were conducted without a remote operator and, as such, are missing critical elements 
required to assess the CCA functional requirements. Programs such as NASA’s ERAST 
(Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technologies) demonstrated all of the UAS 
elements; however, ERAST tests were conducted as a demonstration, and only end-to-end 
performance data was recorded.  Many contributing elements of the system were not individually 
recorded or were recorded at a data rate insufficient for the purposes of evaluating the CCA 
functional requirements.  The extent of flight testing required to generate sufficient data to 
analyze requirements precludes that from being a viable option under this program. 
The CCA work package elected to use simulation as the primary tool to establish and validate the 
functional requirements that are laid out in the aforementioned CA Functional Requirements 
Document (FRD).  This CCA Performance Simulation is available, under limited distribution, as 
deliverable CCA008-Rev2.  It was developed to reproduce and analyze a variety of encounter 
scenarios involving UAS operations in the NAS.  The results of this analysis will be used to 
support safety analyses, refine performance guidelines in the FRD, and assist the FAA in 
establishing UAS certification standards.  Furthermore, the simulation will aid manufacturers in 
developing future collision avoidance systems for unmanned aircraft.  Additionally, a Systems 
Integration Lab (SIL) was also developed to provide additional simulation opportunities by 
examining the real-time interactions of actual flight hardware with the simulated aircraft and 
environment. 
1.5 CCA Flight Demonstration  
Understanding that the simulation results will be only as good as the fidelity of the simulation, a 
technology demonstration program was developed to collect detailed flight data for existing 
collision avoidance technologies during anticipated UAS encounters with other aircraft.  The 
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data was used to validate the CCA Performance Simulation and the SIL through comparison of 
modeled aircraft and sensor performance with the flight data. 
Development of the flight demonstration objectives was based on the CCA Objectives, approved 
on 22 March 2005 and shown in Table 1.  There are six collision avoidance general test 
objectives that are further divided into Specific Test Objectives.  While the expectation is that 
most of these objectives will rely on the simulation results, the flight demonstration was 
necessary to validate the simulations and also provide additional data to meet the CCA 
Objectives themselves.  
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Table 1.  CCA Objectives 
CCA 
Objective 
Label 
CCA Objective Description 
CGTO-1 Demonstrate the ability to detect cooperative traffic and provide 
situational awareness to the ROA pilot. 
STO-1.1 Determine the detection range and Minimum Detect Time provided by 
the CCA subsystem. 
STO-1.2 Determine the effective azimuth Field-of-Regard and azimuth accuracy 
of the CCA subsystem 
STO-1.3 Determine the effective elevation Field-of-Regard and elevation accuracy 
of the CCA subsystem. 
STO-1.4 Demonstrate the capability of the CCA subsystem to detect multiple 
threat aircraft. 
CGTO-2 Demonstrate the ability to track the detected cooperative traffic and 
provide position information to the ROA pilot. 
STO-2.1 Demonstrate that the time and position information of cooperative 
aircraft is tracked and presented to the ROA pilot. 
STO-2.2 Demonstrate that tracks of multiple threat aircraft are presented to the 
ROA pilot. 
STO-2.3 Determine the track accuracy of the time and position information 
collected on the cooperative threat aircraft. 
CGTO-3 Demonstrate the ability to determine collision potential with detected 
cooperative traffic and provide notification to the ROA pilot. 
STO-3.1 Observe the information presented to the ROA pilot that conveys 
collision potential. 
STO-3.2 Demonstrate the utility of the CCA subsystem alert that notifies the ROA 
pilot of a potential collision threat. 
CGTO-4 Demonstrate that the CCA subsystem provides information in sufficient 
time for the ROA pilot to initiate an evasive maneuver to avoid collision. 
STO-4.1 Demonstrate that the CCA subsystem alarm is provided in sufficient time 
for the ROA pilot to initiate an evasive maneuver. 
STO-4.2 Demonstrate the utility of a CCA subsystem recommended evasive 
maneuver. 
CGTO-5 Demonstrate an evasive maneuver that avoids collision with the threat 
aircraft. 
STO-5.1 Determine the time required for the ROA pilot to perform an evasive 
maneuver after the CCA subsystem has notified the ROA pilot of a 
potential collision. 
STO-5.2 Demonstrate that the evasive maneuver is within the performance 
limitations of the ROA. 
STO-5.3 Demonstrate that the evasive maneuver resolves the collision threat 
without creating another collision threat with nearby aircraft. 
CGTO-6 Demonstrate the ability to assess the adequacy of the maneuver and 
determine that the collision potential has been avoided. 
STO-6.1 Determine that the evasive maneuver maintains separation from the 
threat aircraft. 
STO-6.2 Demonstrate that the ROA pilot can determine when the ROA is clear of 
conflicting traffic. 
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With selection of simulation as the primary tool to establish functional requirements, the focus of 
the flights was on collecting data to validate the simulation.  A set of Flight Demonstration 
Specific Test Objectives (FSTO), Table 2, was derived from the CCA Objectives to guide the 
planning of the technology demonstration.  Each of the FSTOs directly supports validation of the 
performance simulation for use in determining requirements and guidelines specified in the 
Collision Avoidance CGTOs and STOs. 
 
Table 2.  Flight Demonstration Specific Objectives 
Objective 
Label 
Objective Description 
FSTO-1 Collect data to validate CA sensor models. 
FSTO-2 Collect data to validate link affect models on the transmission of CA sensor data. 
FSTO-3 Collect data to validate the CA display. 
FSTO-4 Collect data to validate operator response to the CA display. 
FSTO-5 Collect data to validate link affect models on the transmission of operator 
evasion commands to the vehicle. 
FSTO-6 Validate the vehicle model during an evasion maneuver. 
FSTO-7 Collect data to validate the resulting miss distance between the UAS and 
intruder during a collision avoidance scenario. 
 
As the technology demonstration data was processed, feasibility of meeting the CCA Objectives 
via analysis of the technology demonstration data was assessed.  A matrix mapping the flight 
demonstration objectives to the analyses described in Section 6 is contained in Appendix A.  
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2 Technology Demonstration Architecture 
The technology demonstration architecture, shown in Figure 1, consisted of two principal 
elements, the Proteus (Host) aircraft and the Air Vehicle Control Station (AVCS).     
The sensors selected for the flight demonstration were the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS-II) and the Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) system.  
TCAS is currently used in the NAS for collision avoidance advisories to the onboard pilot, and 
ADS-B was recently introduced for traffic surveillance.    
Each of the elements in the demonstration also contained instrumentation to record data obtained 
from the CCA sensors and flight navigation systems, so that ‘truth’ position data could later be 
compared to the sensor data.  Details of the elements are presented in the subsections below. 
 
AVCS
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C2
TCAS II
Proteus Aircraft
TCAS II
Autopilot
Control 
Surfaces
ADS-B
Transponder
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Nav
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Sensor Data 
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CCA Laptop
Display
Control 
Panel
Ground CAS 
Logic
Network 
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Ground 
Control 
System 
Flight 
Control 
Input
AVCS
 
Figure 1.  CCA Technology Demonstration Architecture 
2.1 Aircraft 
Aircraft used in the technology demonstration consisted of the Scaled Composites Proteus and a 
Gulfstream G-III owned by NASA.  The Proteus served the role of the ownship, or host, UAS, 
while the G-III served the role of the intruder.   
2.1.1 Proteus (Ownship/Host) 
Scaled Composites, LLC provided a Proteus Optionally Piloted Vehicle (OPV) equipped with 
TCAS-II and ADS-B subsystems.  Proteus (Figure 2) is a twin turbofan high altitude multi-
mission aircraft powered by Williams International FJ44-2E engines.  It is designed to carry 
payloads in the 2000 lb. class to altitudes above 60,000 feet and remain on station up to 14 hours.  
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Figure 2.  Proteus OPV 
Proteus was modified for the CCA technology demonstration by installing the TCAS-II and 
ADS-B sensor systems and by incorporating software in the Flight Management System (FMS) 
to collect and format traffic data so it could be included on the communication link used for 
aircraft control.  The other equipment on the aircraft during this test is the standard equipment on 
the aircraft.  Proteus was manned during all testing with a pilot and a co-pilot.  The autopilot was 
employed to guide the aircraft through the encounter scenarios.  However, the pilot and co-pilot 
had the ability to assume command of the aircraft at any time deemed necessary.  The flight crew 
was provided by Scaled Composites and complied with FAA regulations. 
2.1.1.1 CCA Sensors  
The Proteus OPV was modified to include a TCAS-II processor, control panel, directional 
antenna, VSI/TRA display, Mode S diversity transponder, RCZ transponder, and Mode S 
transponder Antenna.  An ADS-B processor, omni antenna and GPS antenna were also installed. 
2.1.1.1.1 TCAS 
The TCAS II hardware selected for this architecture is the ACSS TCAS 2000 suite.  The 
processor in this suite of equipment, the ACSS RT-951 receiver/transmitter, contains dual 
processors that implement the surveillance and collision avoidance functions.  The Mode S 
transponder, ACSS RCZ-852, implements all currently defined Mode S functions.  Four 
antennas are used in the architecture to provide the omni-directional Mode S data link (top and 
bottom) and directional TCAS signal sensing from positions on both the upper and lower 
fuselage.  The safety pilot in the aircraft interfaced with this equipment through a transponder 
control panel.  Aural TCAS commands and the Vertical Speed/Traffic Indicator (VSI/TRA), 
which displays traffic advisories and TCAS climb/descend commands resulting from TCAS 
resolution advisories (RA), were implemented on board the aircraft for use by the safety pilots 
during the test runs. 
2.1.1.1.2 ADS-B 
The ADS-B equipment selected for this architecture was the Garmin GDL 90 Universal Access 
Transceiver (UAT) with a WAAS GPS sensor for high position accuracy and integrity.  It is 
designed to transmit, receive, and decode ADS-B messages via a 978 MHz broadband data link 
certified to support a broad range of ADS-B services in manned aircraft.  The ADS-B installation 
did not include a display in the aircraft. 
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2.1.2 G-III (Intruder) 
The intruder aircraft was chosen to provide closure velocities representative of the majority of 
aircraft that currently operate above FL430.  NASA Dryden Flight Research Center provided a 
Gulfstream III (G-III) for these tests (Figure 3).  This aircraft was manned by NASA personnel 
and flown in accordance with FAA and NASA regulations.  
 
 
Figure 3.  G-III Intruder Aircraft 
 
2.1.2.1 CCA Sensors  
Since the G-III was previously equipped with a TCAS system, the only equipment added to the 
aircraft was a Garmin GDL-90 Universal Access Transceiver for ADS-B.   
2.1.2.1.1 TCAS 
The TCAS hardware on the aircraft comprised a Honeywell RT-951 receiver/transmitter with 
dual processors to implement the surveillance and collision avoidance functions and a Rockwell 
Collins TDR-94D Mode-S transponder.  Two Honeywell AT-910 antennas provided directional 
information, while the transponder used the Sensor systems S65-5366-2L antennas.  Two 
Honeywell VSI/TRA displays were installed in the cockpit for displaying traffic advisories and 
TCAS climb/descend commands resulting from TCAS resolution advisories (RA). 
2.1.2.1.2 ADS-B 
The ADS-B equipment selected for the G-III was the same model Garmin GDL 90 Universal 
Access Transceiver (UAT) used in the Host aircraft (Section 2.1.1.1.2).  It used existing omni-
directional antennas to broadcast and receive ADS-B information.  Like the Proteus, no display 
was installed in the aircraft. 
2.1.2.2 Instrumentation 
The existing instrumentation system was used to record airborne flight parameters.  The TCAS 
and ADS-B data was not recorded on-board; therefore, no special software was required to 
collect sensor data. 
2.2 Air Vehicle Control Station (AVCS) 
In addition to the Proteus aircraft, Scaled Composites also provided the AVCS with existing air-
to-ground communications, command and control (C2) link, ground pilot, pilot controls, and 
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Ground Control System for processing and recording data received from the aircraft.  To meet 
CCA test requirements, Scaled Composites also provided a communications latency module that 
delayed receipt and transmission of C2 messages to simulate beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) 
transmission delays. 
2.2.1 Ground Control System (GCS)  
Proteus was controlled remotely via the Ground Control System (GCS).  Using the display from 
a single desktop computer, the UAS pilot monitored system health and navigation/situational 
awareness.  The UAS pilot also had the ability to command and control Proteus from the GCS by 
using the display, mouse, and keyboard to issue commands that control the vehicle through the 
onboard flight management system.  The GCS also recorded data transmitted from and to the 
aircraft. 
2.2.2 Flight Control Inputs 
Vehicle control was accomplished through keyboard and mouse inputs.  GCS software was 
developed to provide a selection of discrete climb/descent rates for the pilot to select when the 
CCA system generated a climb/descend recommendation.  The pilot would select the desired rate 
from the display and then send the command to the aircraft via the C2 link with a single mouse 
click.  
2.2.3 Latency Generator 
FSTO-2 called for collection of data relative to transmission delays between the aircraft and 
ground station.  Because all flight testing was to be accomplished within line of sight, a software 
module was required to extend, or delay, the time for both uplink and downlink transmissions, 
thus emulating BLOS data transmissions.  Since both downlink and uplink commands were to be 
delayed, the software module was developed by Scaled Composites and implemented in the 
GCS. 
2.2.4 CCA Laptop 
For the technology demonstration, the CCA Laptop only used the Collision Avoidance System 
(CAS) algorithms and CCA display features of the Common Tool (CT). The laptop was installed 
in the AVCS beside the GCS as a separate display.  The pilot reacted to CCA information 
provided on the CCA Laptop display and responded through inputs to the GCS.  An interface 
between the GCS and the CCA Laptop was developed to pass sensor data from the Proteus to the 
CT.  Figure 4 shows the CCA Display which was designed to mimic TCAS-II displays, and to 
provide Vertical Speed Indicator (VSI) guidance as well as aural advisories whenever the 
integrated CAS algorithm determined that a maneuver was necessary.  
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Figure 4.  Common Tool Display 
 
2.2.5 UAS Pilot 
The Proteus OPV was controlled remotely from the GCS located at the Scaled Composites 
facilities in Mojave, CA.  The ground pilot was provided by Scaled Composites and was fully 
qualified in the aircraft.  The Test Conductor handled radio communications between the GCS 
and aircraft to allow the ground pilot to focus on CCA test objectives.  A limited number of test 
participants were also present in the AVCS to control test operations and for manual data 
recording. 
2.2.6 Command and Control (C2) Link 
Scaled Composites provided the C2 link for the CCA flight demonstration.  In addition to adding 
the sensor parameters to the data packets, the communication link was modified mid-way 
through the flight demonstration to improve the C2 link availability.  The system operated on a 
consumer band that includes cordless phones and other wireless products.  On the early flights in 
the demonstration, frequency hopping often resulted in use of frequencies with significant 
interference.  The modifications limited the hopping to frequencies with little or no interference. 
2.2.7 Global Positioning System (GPS) 
A GPS receiver was installed in the AVCS to provide an accurate time reference for data 
recorded in the GCS and the CCA Laptop. 
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2.3 Data Collection 
To facilitate a detailed analysis of system performance, sensor errors, transmission latencies, and 
other issues, data was recorded at numerous points in the architecture indicated by the circled 
letters shown in Figure 5.  Each source was equipped with a Global Positioning System (GPS) 
receiver to provide a consistent Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) reference for all the recorded 
data.  The parameters listed in this section are the primary data used to perform the analysis 
described later in this document.  A complete listing of all parameters recorded at each location 
is included in Appendix A.   
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Figure 5.  Data Collection Points for the CCA Technology Demonstration 
 
2.3.1 Intruder (G-III)  
The existing G-III instrumentation system was used to record multiple position sources and 
aircraft parameters.  Data collection on the G-III intruder aircraft was limited to ‘truth’ position 
data and other aircraft performance parameters but did not include CCA sensor data since that 
data would also be available on the Host instrumentation.  Pressure Altitude data was available 
from two of the position sources on the aircraft. 
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2.3.1.1 G-III ‘Truth’ Position Data Sources [Data Collection Point ‘I’] 
There were five sources of time and space position information (TSPI) available on the G-III.  
As shown in Table 3, all five sources provided latitude and longitude information.  The two FMS 
sources contained a blended solution using two inertial navigation systems, and they also 
provided pressure altitude data.  The next two sources contained strictly GPS solutions.  The fifth 
source contained a differential GPS solution expected to have better accuracy than the other data.  
All data was recorded at 40 Hz.  
 
Table 3.  G-III ‘Truth’ Position Data Sources 
Data Source Latitude/ Longitude 
Pressure 
Altitude 
Flight Management System 1 (fms1) X X 
Flight Management System 2 (fms2) X X 
Global Positioning System 1 (gps1) X  
Global Positioning System 2 (gps2) X  
ZXT GPS (zxt) X  
 
2.3.2 Host (Proteus)  
The Proteus had an existing instrumentation system that was used to collect and record aircraft 
data.  However, the instrumentation system was modified to also record TCAS and ADS-B 
sensor data as it was prepared for transmission to the ground station.  All data was recorded at 10 
Hz.  A complete parameter list is contained in Appendix A. 
2.3.2.1 Proteus ‘Truth’ Position Data [Data Collection Point ‘F’] 
There were two sources of TSPI available on the Proteus aircraft:  GPS and Inertial Navigation 
System (INS).  The INS values were a blended solution from a CMIGITS II GPS-aided inertial 
system.  Although pressure altitude was not recorded directly on the aircraft, Static Pressure was 
recorded to allow calculation of the pressure altitude. 
2.3.2.2 Proteus FMS Data [Data Collection Point ‘E’] 
While the bulk of the parameters recorded on the aircraft were CCA sensor data, there were over 
40 channels of aircraft state and system status data available to allow accurate determination of 
aircraft position and velocities in the three axes. Additional information from the autopilot 
provided indications when the ground pilot had control of the aircraft and when the aircraft 
received command inputs. 
2.3.2.3 Proteus CCA Sensor Data [Data Collection Point ‘A’] 
2.3.2.3.1 ADS-B Sensor Data  
The FMS recorded 29 channels of ADS-B data that included information on the host aircraft and 
up to three intruders, as shown in Table 4.  During the test planning process, the decision was 
made to limit the intruder data to three sets in order to control the amount of data transmitted due 
to bandwidth concerns.  The ‘number of intruders’ parameter listed below is not an ADS-B 
parameter but was generated by the host aircraft.  Because of limited usage of ADS-B near the 
test area, it was also anticipated that there would be no more than three ADS-B signals received 
from other aircraft at any time in the test.  ADS-B data was updated at 1 Hz. 
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Table 4.  ADS-B Parameters 
Aircraft Parameter Description 
ADSB_INT Number of intruders Host 
ADSBPRTS Host vehicle ID 
Intruders ADSBIntX Intruder vehicle ID 
ADSBTmeX ADS-B time stamp 
ADSBLatX Latitude 
ADSBLngX Longitude 
ADSBAltX Altitude 
ADSBVVIX Vertical velocity 
Host and Intruders 
ADSBLMRX Data message missed 
X – (P) for Host, (1-3) for Intruders, e.g., ADSBLat2 is Latitude of Intruder #2 
 
2.3.2.3.2 TCAS Sensor Data 
The FMS also recorded 30 channels of TCAS data for the host aircraft and up to three intruders, 
as shown in Table 5.  As with ADS-B, intruders were limited to three even though TCAS is 
widely used and it was anticipated that more than three TCAS signals could be received at any 
given time.  Also, as with ADS-B, the host aircraft generates the number of intruders parameter 
listed below.  For TCAS, the Proteus FMS included logic to select the three closest aircraft for 
inclusion in the transmitted data.  TCAS data was updated at 1 Hz. 
 
Table 5.  TCAS Parameters 
Aircraft Parameter Description 
TCAS_INT Number of intruders 
RA_Climb 
RA_Dscnd 
RA_AltRt 
RA_VrtCt 
Host 
RA_CmbCt 
Host TCAS Vertical RA Data 
Output Word values 
TCASIntX Intruder ID (set on Host) 
TCASTmeX TCAS time stamp 
TCAS RngX Relative range 
TCASBrgX Relative bearing 
TCASRAlX Relative altitude 
TCASArrX Display arrow 
TCASACdX Advisory code 
Intruders 
TCASSSMX Data status 
X – (1-3) for Intruders 
 
2.3.2.4 Proteus Raw GPS 
After initial review of the GPS data in the Proteus FMS data release, it appeared that the data had 
been corrupted in some way and did not provide accurate position information.  Scaled 
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Composites was able to go back through the FMS flight data and prepare a release of the raw 
GPS data input to the FMS.  This source was then added as a potential source for ‘truth’ position 
data. 
2.3.3 Air Vehicle Control Station (AVCS) 
2.3.3.1 Ground Control System (GCS) [Data Collection Points ‘B’ and ‘D’]  
The GCS recorded the same CCA sensor data parameters sent by the aircraft plus the pilot 
control inputs sent back to the aircraft with a GPS time stamp from the receiver installed in the 
AVCS.  This data was necessary to meet FSTO-2 and FSTO-5 goals for assessing the link delays 
and data missed rates.    
2.3.3.2 Common Tool (CT) [Data Collection Point ‘C’] 
In addition to recording the same CCA sensor data sent by the aircraft, the CT also recorded 
output from the ground collision avoidance logic to determine what was displayed to the pilot 
during each test run.  The parameters unique to the CT are presented in Table 6.  The CT 
recorded data at 10 Hz. 
 
Table 6.  Common Tool Display Parameters 
Parameter Description 
AaAllClear 
AaDescend 
AaClimb 
AaVerticalSpeed 
CT aural alert Boolean values  
RaVerticalControl 
RaClimb 
RaDescend 
CT parameters controlling RAs 
RaAltRateGoal RA vertical velocity goal 
Intr1AdvisoryCode 
Intr2AdvisoryCode 
Intr3AdvisoryCode 
Advisory code for intruders 
(Proximate, TA, RA) 
 
2.3.4 Video Recorder [Data Collection Point ‘G’] 
A video recorder was positioned to record the GCS and CT displays.  For most of the flights, the 
recorder was turned on at the beginning of a test run, but there is no time reference or indication 
of the run number on the video.  The video data was not used during the analysis described later 
in this report. 
2.3.5 Scribe Notes 
A test observer collected data recording the time of CCA aural and visual displays as well as 
when the ground pilot sent a command to the aircraft following an RA.  The scribe used local 
time in the notes. The terms “yellow warning” and “red warning” refer to states of the CCA 
display in which the host aircraft symbol turns yellow to indicate a possible traffic conflict (TA) 
and red to indicate that an avoidance maneuver should be executed (RA). The term “all clear” 
refers to a state of the CCA display in which an aural announcement is made when the host is 
clear of a previous traffic conflict. The terms “climb climb”, “descend descend”, and “monitor 
 Page 24 of 80 
vertical speed” refer to aural warnings made by the CCA display to coincide with a visual 
maneuver advisory.   
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3 Simulation Architecture  
Three tools have been developed to simulate encounters requiring collision avoidance activities.  
The first, the CCA Performance Simulation, is a virtual software-only environment.  The 
Systems Integration Lab, or SIL, includes several components of flight-quality collision 
avoidance hardware.  The third tool, the Common Tool (CT), provides several functions, 
including a simple simulation of the ownships and intruders.  The architectures of these tools are 
described in the following sub-sections. 
3.1 CCA Performance Simulation 
The CCA Performance Simulation is a Simulink®-based software application that can be used to 
analyze UAS collision avoidance in various encounter scenarios.  A high level view of the 
simulation architecture is shown in Figure 6.  Each of the air vehicles is represented by an 
element of code, which can be customized to model the desired closed-loop flight dynamics and 
CCA sensor equipage.  The ownship segment also includes coded representations of the Air 
Vehicle Control Station and the CCA Laptop.  . 
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Figure 6.  CCA Performance Simulation High-Level Architecture 
 
The aircraft models can be initialized in a trimmed state for straight and level flight prior to 
running the model dynamically with time.  By default, the aircraft fly following script-generated 
waypoints.  However, pilot commands from the AVCS to the UAS can override waypoint 
following, thus allowing the UAS to avoid a potential collision.  During these collision scenarios, 
the intruder aircraft continue to follow their previously computed waypoints. 
The reason for developing the performance simulation is to have the capability to vary the 
multitude of parameters that describe an encounter scenario and then analyze the results.  This 
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analysis will then be used to validate the collision avoidance functional requirements and 
perform safety analysis tasks as well.  With so much depending upon the accuracy of the 
simulation output, it is essential that it be carefully tuned to match reality.  This explains the 
motivation for performing the technology demonstration:  providing real world data with which 
to validate the simulation.  This ensures that the CCA Performance Simulation will then produce 
realistic data for further analysis and requirements validation. 
3.1.1 Architecture 
The CCA Performance Simulation is a four-vehicle simulation laid out in the architecture shown 
in Figure 6, of which an example is shown in Figure 7.  Up to four vehicles (in any combination 
of UAS or manned), can coexist in the same airspace and transmit their own position information 
to the other aircraft via cooperative CCA sensors. 
 
 
Figure 7.  High-Level Simulation Architecture Example 
 
Figure 8 provides more detail on the composition of the UAS Ownship model and a manned 
intruder model.  The Vehicle Simulation and Onboard Equipment (VSOE) models for each type 
of aircraft are the same and include: 
• An Ownship Vehicle Simulation (OVS) representing closed-loop flight dynamics of the 
air vehicle 
• ADS-B and TCAS-II CCA sensor models 
• A CCA Universal Box (CUB) element that represents translation of data between 
hardware elements. 
The only differences between the manned vehicle model and UAS vehicle model are the 
inclusion of AVCS and CCA Laptop models and the location of the pilot model.   
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Figure 8.  UAS and Manned Aircraft Model Architectures 
 
To date, the CCA simulation studies have been limited to two-vehicle encounter scenarios.  
Translation of the Figure 6 high-level architecture into its two-vehicle Simulink® equivalent is 
depicted in Figure 9.   
 
 
Figure 9.  Simulation Simulink® Architecture 
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ROA  “ Ownship ” UAS  
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Here in the Simulink® simulation, each aircraft model is contained in its own block.   Air-to-air 
communications have been consolidated into one massive signal, which is distributed to each 
aircraft.  Since the simulation is set up for four aircraft, but only two vehicles are truly present, 
two empty or nulled vehicles exist to maintain internal signal dimensions.   
The translation of the UAS and manned aircraft architectures from Figure 8 is shown in Figure 
10 and Figure 11, respectively.  Note again that each aircraft type shares common blocks like the 
TCAS-II and ADS-B. The only major difference is that the UAS aircraft model carries AVCS 
and CCA Laptop models. 
 
 
Figure 10.  UAS Simulink® Architecture 
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Figure 11.  Manned Aircraft Simulink® Architecture 
 
3.1.2 System Requirements 
The CCA Performance Simulation was developed in MATLAB®/Simulink® for Windows/PC 
use.  Models and code were developed on IBM NetVista machines using the programs listed in 
Table 7.  The models are not backwards compatible with previous versions MATLAB® and 
Simulink®.  The models must be used with the indicated version listed in the table below. 
 
Table 7.  Software Development Toolset 
 
A Linux version of the CCA Performance Simulation also has been developed but has not been 
fully tested.   
3.1.3 Software Release 
The CCA Performance Simulation version 2.0 was released on 13 February 2006 as deliverable 
CCA008-Rev2.  The deliverable includes all the files needed to set up and run the simulation and 
Name Version Operating System 
MATLAB® 7.0.4 (R14 SP 2) Windows 2000 Pro, Windows XP 
Simulink® 6.2 (R14 SP 2) Windows 2000 Pro, Windows XP 
Simulink® Stateflow 6.2 (R14 SP 2) Windows 2000 Pro, Windows XP 
Microsoft .NET Framework 1.0 1.0.3705 Windows 2000 Pro, Windows XP 
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to simulate the Technology Demonstration flight runs.  It also includes documentation such as a 
user’s manual, a simulation Interface Control Document (ICD), and training materials. 
3.2 CCA Systems Integration Lab (SIL) 
The CCA SIL comprises a real-time, hardware-in-the-loop simulation residing at the Northrop 
Grumman Corporation in El Segundo, CA (Figure 12).  Its purposes are to support the 
technology demonstration, to support simulation model validation, and to provide a test bed for 
continued analysis.  It supported preparation for the technology demonstration by identifying the 
various issues that might arise when integrating the various pieces of hardware such as TCAS-II, 
ADS-B, and the Mode S transponder.  It proved valuable during the technology demonstration to 
troubleshoot data link and intruder tracking issues and to develop and test revised CAS logic to 
accommodate the flight test setup.  It also serves as a platform for testing the Common Tool and 
its interfaces to the system.  Because it contains real hardware, the SIL is also able to validate the 
simulation component models for TCAS and ADS-B.  Finally, the SIL provides a test bed for 
continued analysis of collision avoidance requirements.  Once it is validated, the SIL can be used 
to assess an expanded set of encounter scenarios beyond the limitations of the CCA technology 
demonstration.   
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Figure 12.  CCA Systems Integration Laboratory (SIL) 
3.2.1 Architecture 
The CCA SIL architecture is shown in Figure 13.  Items in red represent actual flight hardware, 
while the yellow boxes each represent a computer.  The simulation data bus, shown in green, 
passes data between simulation elements.  The various busses connecting the hardware elements 
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are color coded as shown in the key.  Each major element of the SIL is described in more detail 
below. 
 
 
Figure 13.  CCA SIL Architecture 
 
The TCAS II, Mode-S and ValFAC work together to provide the TCAS CCA sensor function.  
The TCAS II hardware is the same ACSS TCAS 2000 suite installed in the Proteus and 
described in Section 2.1.1.1.1.  The processor is the ACSS RT-951 receiver/transmitter, and the 
Mode S transponder is the ACSS RCZ-852.  The ValFAC (Validation Facility), shown in Figure 
14, is a piece of laboratory hardware procured from ACSS that allows end to end use of the 
TCAS system in a laboratory environment.  The ValFAC is driven by simulation data and 
outputs an RF environment to the TCAS antenna ports.  The TCAS II unit passes data to the rest 
of the SIL over the ARINC 429/735 display data bus via the CUB. 
 
 
Figure 14.  ValFAC 
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The SIL contains two ADS-B units:  one each for the ownship and the intruder.  The ADS-B 
equipment, shown in Figure 15, is the same Garmin GDL 90 model installed in the Proteus and 
described in Section 2.1.1.1.2.  The ADS-B units communicate with each other in the SIL over 
RF via line leakage from terminated coaxial cables attached to each unit’s antenna port.  Each 
units GPS positions is driven by simulation data supplied by the CUB over ARINC 429/743A.  
They pass data to the rest of the SIL over the RS-422 port, configured to output traffic data, via 
the CUB.   
 
Figure 15.  ADS-B Unit 
The ownship and intruder simulation PCs use the Linux operating system to run a real-time 
version of the CCA Performance Simulation’s OVS.  The individual vehicle simulations are 
prepared by generating C++ code from the Simulink® OVS block subsystem.  Simulink® outputs 
an initialization data file containing vehicle parameters, trim states, and mission plan.  The 
scenario can be modified without recompiling.  The ownship simulation PC also drives the 
heartbeat of the entire SIL simulation.   
The CCA Universal Box (CUB) was designed as a universal converter between different 
hardware and software interfaces.  Hardware interfaces involved in the ACCESS 5 SIL includes 
Ethernet, ARINC 429, and RS422.  These interfaces require special communication hardware 
and software, therefore, a custom built PC loaded with SUSE Linux and a software package was 
developed to synchronize, convert, and transfer data flowing through the simulation.  Figure 16 
shows both a diagram of the translations performed by the CUB and a photo of the real hardware 
with connectors.  The CUB provides some of the functionality of both the onboard and GCS 
processing.  Interfaces include: 
Ethernet:  Ethernet is used to provide point to point communication for Non-Time Critical 
Data.  Because of its well defined interface structures and ease of use, it is being used as 
an interface for CCA Laptop to Ground Control Station 
RS-422:  RS-422 is used for receiving Traffic Data from GDL-90 Traffic Data Bus 
ARINC 429:  An ARINC 429 card is used for both transmitting GPS Input to GDL-90 using 
ARINC 743A label format and receiving TCAS-II Traffic Data using ARINC 735 label 
format. 
. 
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Figure 16.  CCA Universal Bus (CUB) 
 
The Common Tool provides CCA display and pilot input functions.  A picture of both these 
functions is shown in Figure 17.   
 
 
Figure 17.  Common Tool Display in SIL 
 Page 34 of 80 
3.2.2 Software 
The SIL consists of many software elements.  Table 8 lists the versions of all of the software 
modules used.  The vehicle model is auto-coded from the Vehicle_Model subsystem of the 
SIL_SIMULATION_V2_0 and is built from the same library block as the performance 
simulation.  To match the flight test, software version 4p4 of the common tool and version 
4p0/4p1 of the ground CAS is set up for use in the SIL. 
 
Table 8.  SIL Software Configuration 
Software Element Version 
Vehicle Mode SIL_SIMULATION_V2_0 
Common Tool Version 4p4 
Ground CAS  NGC_CAS_v4_0 
NGC_CAS_v4_1 
 
3.3 Common Tool 
Among its many functions, the CT can provide a simple simulation of the ownship and intruders.  
The CT also serves as the CCA Laptop in the SIL, providing CCA display and pilot input 
functions.  Figure 18 outlines the functional architecture of the CT and its available hardware 
interfaces. 
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Figure 18.  Common Tool Architecture 
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4 Test Conduct 
The flight demonstration was conducted in the Isabella Military Operating Area (MOA) near 
Edwards AFB, CA, between 21 September 2005 and 28 September 2005.  During the program 
six flights were flown, with Proteus (21.5 flight hours) as the Host aircraft and the G-III (19.8 
hours) serving as the Intruder.  Flights were executed in accordance with the NASA Access 5 
Cooperative Collision Avoidance Step 1 Technology Demonstration Flight Test Plan, Revision 
1.5, dated 12 August 2005.  Table 9 shows a summary of the flights. 
 
Table 9.  CCA Technology Demonstration Flights Summary 
Access 5 
Flt No. Date 
Proteus 
Flt No. 
G-III 
Flt No. Runs 
Common 
Tool Data 
(Runs) 
Comments 
       A5-1 21 Sep 05 368 23 16 16 No time stamp on Proteus 
data 
A5-2 22 Sep 05 369 24 15 13  
A5-3 22 Sep 05 370 25 12 11  
A5-4 23 Sep 05 371 26 0 None Photo Chase 
A5-5 26 Sep 05 374 27 4 4  
A5-6 27 Sep 05 375 28 27 27 Proteus FMS data delivered 
for first 23 runs only 
 
4.1 Test Runs 
While the focus of Access 5 Step 1 is operation above FL 430, the demonstration was conducted 
at 15,000 ft MSL for test efficiency and to provide a sufficient flight envelope margin for the 
aircraft to perform avoidance maneuvers when required.  For a test run, each aircraft departed 
from an Initial Point (IP) at a time that would have them arrive at the intercept point 
simultaneously.  The Proteus aircraft always used the same IP while the G-III used four different 
IPs to generate co-heading, low-aspect, abeam, and head-on encounter geometries.  For level 
(constant altitude) runs, the aircraft departed their IPs at the planned safety buffer separation 
altitude of 300 ft with the G-III always below the Host.  For runs requiring either of the aircraft 
to be changing altitude during the encounter, the aircraft departed with an increased altitude 
separation, and the desired climb/descent rate was established at a time that would result in the 
required minimum 300 ft altitude separation at the point of closest approach.  
4.1.1 Airspeed 
The Proteus test airspeed, 110 KIAS, was in the heart of Proteus’s speed envelope at 15,000 ft 
MSL.  The G-III speed, 300 KIAS, was selected to provide typical closure rates between HALE 
aircraft and airliner traffic at FL 430 while remaining within the G-III operating speed envelope.  
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4.1.2 Test Matrix 
Each test run was defined by a combination of an encounter geometry scenario, a CCA 
sensor/maneuver advisory suite, a look-ahead buffer, a data link latency, and a climb 
performance limit.  The resulting combinations that were selected for demonstration are 
summarized in Table 10, while an explanation of each element is provided in the following sub-
sections.  The total number of planned test runs resulting from this matrix was 54.  
 
Table 10.  Test Run Matrix 
Scenario 
Sensor / 
Maneuver 
Advisory 
Suite1 
Look-Ahead 
Buffer (sec) 
Link 
Delay 
(sec) 
GCAS Max 
Climb Rate 
(fpm) 
TCAS 
Climb 
Inhibit 
TGC 0 0 1000 n/a 
AGA 0 0 1000 n/a 
TRT 0 0 n/a Yes 
1,2,3 
TRT 0 0 n/a Yes 
TGC 6 0 2500 n/a 
TGC 4 0 2500 n/a 
TGC 2 0 2500 n/a 
TGC * 0 0 2500 n/a 
TGC 4 2 2500 n/a 
AGA 6 0 2500 n/a 
AGA 4 0 2500 n/a 
AGA 2 0 2500 n/a 
AGA * 0 0 2500 n/a 
AGA 4 2 2500 n/a 
TRT 0 0 n/a No 
4,5,6 
TRT 0 0 n/a No 
1  One repetition for each configuration except two for those marked with *  
 
4.1.2.1 Encounter Geometry Scenario 
Each flight consisted of a series of encounters between the two aircraft using the scenarios 
shown in Figure 19.  These scenarios are a subset of geometries previously used for TCAS 
analysis that were selected on the basis of anticipated real-world encounters between a UAS at or 
above FL 430 and a faster moving intruder aircraft.  Additionally, the selection process 
attempted to provide a variety of encounters that would facilitate validation of the simulation.  
Finally, safety of flight tailored the encounters to maximize safety pilot visibility from the 
intruder aircraft.   
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Co-Heading, Co-Alt, Intruder Overtaking
Head-On, Descending
Low Aspect, Co-Alt
Co-Heading, Intruder Climbing
Abeam, Co-Alt
Head-On, Co-Alt
 
Figure 19.  Encounter Geometry Scenarios 
 
4.1.2.2 Sensor/Maneuver Advisory Suite 
The test architecture was designed to test three CCA sensor/maneuver advisory suite 
configurations that examined the tradeoffs between the two sensor technologies and the source of 
the collision avoidance logic.  The three-letter nomenclature used in Table 10 to specify the 
sensor suite consists of: 
First letter:  the host aircraft sensor (A – ADS-B or T – TCAS),  
Second letter:  the logic used for generating alerts (G – Ground CAS logic or R – On-board 
TCAS logic), and  
Third letter:  the intruder aircraft sensor (A – ADS-B, C – Mode C Transponder or T – 
TCAS). 
The specific combinations used in the technology demonstration are translated in Table 11  and 
described in the following sub-sections. 
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Table 11.  Sensor/Maneuver Advisory Suite Nomenclature 
Acronym Host Aircraft CCA 
Sensor 
Maneuver Advisory 
Source 
Intruder Aircraft 
CCA Sensor 
TGC TCAS II Ground CAS Logic Mode C Transponder 
AGA ADS-B Ground CAS Logic ADS-B 
TRT TCAS-II On-board TCAS 
Resolution Advisory 
TCAS-II/Mode S 
 
4.1.2.2.1 TRT 
The host TCAS system receives information from the intruder transponder, and the on-board 
TCAS collision avoidance logic calculates range, bearing, and relative altitude information.  The 
Host TCAS system issues Traffic Advisories (TA) when required and coordinates Resolution 
Advisories (RA) with the intruder to ensure the aircraft execute compatible maneuvers (although 
only the host executes the avoidance maneuver).  The information is passed through the aircraft 
FMS to the AVCS for display on the Common Tool. 
4.1.2.2.2 TGC 
The Host TCAS system receives the Intruder Mode C transponder information and passes range, 
bearing and relative altitude to the Ground Collision Avoidance System (CAS) logic through the 
aircraft FMS and GCS.  The ground CAS logic uses algorithms similar to TCAS to issue 
advisories that are displayed on the Common Tool display.  In this case, however, the RA cannot 
be coordinated with the intruder and only the host executes a maneuver when required.   
4.1.2.2.3 AGA 
This sensor suite is similar to TGC except the position data is supplied by the host and intruder 
ADS-B systems.  The host receives a position broadcast from the intruder that contains latitude, 
longitude, and altitude information.  That data, and the host position data, is transmitted to the 
ground CAS logic through the same communication links as in the other suites.  The CAS logic 
then converts the latitude and longitude data for both aircraft into relative range and bearing that 
are used to issue TAs and RAs exactly as in the TGC configuration   
4.1.2.3 Look-Ahead Buffer 
This time represents an additional “look-ahead” that was used in the ground CAS logic to issue 
RAs before the time a TCAS RA would have been issued.  It was implemented to examine 
options to offset data latencies and to provide an additional safety buffer during the flight test.  It 
was varied from 0 to 6 seconds in 2 second increments during abeam and head-on scenarios 
because of higher closure rates.  
4.1.2.4 Link Delay 
The latency generator in the GCS provided the option to delay transmission of data to and from 
the aircraft.  It was used during the flight demonstration to examine the effects of beyond line-of-
sight communication delays.  For the abeam and head-on scenarios, runs were made with no 
buffer/no link delay and then with 4 sec buffer/2 sec link delay to determine if similar results 
were obtained. 
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4.1.2.5 Climb Performance 
The climb capability of UAS can vary greatly at FL 430.  To demonstrate the CCA architecture 
in both a higher performance UAS and in those that are approaching their service ceiling, 
settings were used in both the ground CAS logic and in the TCAS to limit climb performance for 
the co-heading and low-aspect runs.  These scenarios were selected to demonstrate reduced UAS 
performance because they presented a lower flight test risk with slower closing velocities and 
clear visibility of the host from the intruder.  
4.1.2.5.1 GCAS Maximum Climb Rate 
The ground CAS logic had a software setting that was used to limit the maximum rate of climb 
commanded during an RA.  For the co-heading and low-aspect scenarios, the climb rate was 
limited to 1000 fpm while a rate more consistent with TCAS, 2500 fpm, was used for the 
remaining scenarios.   
4.1.2.5.2 TCAS Climb Inhibit 
For the TRT runs at co-heading and low aspect, a limited climb capability was demonstrated by 
configuring the TCAS installation pin settings to indicate the aircraft had limited climb 
capability at that altitude and therefore inhibit a climb RA.   
4.2 Test Summary 
Seventy-two total data passes were accomplished during the six flights.  Fifty-three of the 54 test 
points were attempted with 49 accomplished successfully. Additionally, six runs were 
accomplished twice – once each with different versions of the Common Tool and CAS 
algorithm.  Forty-five of the 72 passes included an avoidance maneuver through the point of 
closest approach.   
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5 Data Processing 
This section describes the data received from the technology demonstration, the method used to 
process the data, and rationale for selecting from redundant data. 
5.1 Methodology 
Data from the various recording points (Section 2.3) was provided to the CCA Work Package 
team in large data files of various formats.  Scaled Composites provided Proteus aircraft and 
GCS data as ASCII text files identified by flight number.  They ranged in file size from about 
110 MB to over 300 MB.  The G-III data for each flight contained a separate 7-24 MB file for 
each of the 73 parameters recorded.  These sources recorded data for the entire flight without an 
indication of the beginning or end of the individual test runs.  The Common Tool data, however, 
was recorded for each run in a 3-25 MB file depending on the length of the run. Additionally, 
raw Proteus GPS input data files of 1-4 MB were provided after preliminary analysis identified 
corrupt GPS position data recorded in the FMS.  All raw data was processed with Visual Basic 6 
applications developed by the CCA Work Package, and selected parameters were loaded into 
Microsoft Access databases to facilitate analysis.  All data files except the raw GPS contained a 
GPS Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) time stamp.   
The first step in loading the data was to identify start and stop times for each of the runs.  The 
FMS data contained a parameter that indicated when the autopilot was engaged and disengaged.  
This indicated when the ground pilot took control at the beginning of the run and when the pass 
(encounter) was terminated.  Using the times for these two events, the data was loaded and 
indexed to flight and run number for all the data sources. 
In order to compare data between the various sources, a common time step reference was 
required.  The G-III data was recorded at 40 Hz and other sources were recorded at 10 Hz.  Most 
of the data to be analyzed, GPS, ADS-B, and TCAS, only updated at 1 Hz.  Figure 20 shows how 
the first time step for each data update was selected and then data points were interpolated to 
place the data points at common time points every half second at time fractions of .0 and .5 sec.  
Capturing interpolated data at 2 Hz was determined to be sufficient to represent the 1 Hz data. 
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Interpolated Data Example 
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Figure 20.  Interpolated Data Example 
5.2 G-III Truth Data 
Although several position sources were available on the G-III, as shown in Table 12 only one 
source was available for all of the 72 runs accomplished due to either missing or frozen data.  
GPS1 was selected as the ‘truth’ source to provide a consistent position reference for analysis 
even though the zxt source was expected to have more precise data.  Data values were 
interpolated at half-second increments as described in Section 5.1.  
 
Table 12.  G-III Latitude/Longitude Position Source Availability 
System Availability 
Flight Management System 1 (fms1) 8% 
Flight Management System 2 (fms2) 5% 
Global Positioning System 1 (gps1) 100% 
Global Positioning System 2 (gps2) 72% 
ZXT GPS (zxt) 50% 
5.3 Proteus Truth Data 
After initial plots of the Proteus GPS, INS, and ADS-B data indicated that the GPS data had been 
corrupted by FMS processing, the INS reference remained the only available option for ‘truth’ 
data since ADS-B was to be compared to the truth in the analysis.  Since ADS-B is a pure GPS 
solution, it was preferable to compare that data to another GPS source instead of a blended GPS-
INS solution, and a request for corrected GPS data was sent to Scaled Composites.  Even though 
the data couldn’t be corrected in the FMS, the raw GPS inputs were available and were 
processed for use as the ‘truth’ source.  The raw GPS data was referenced to midnight on Sunday 
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with a 13 second leap-second correction required to reference the data to UTC.  Data values were 
interpolated at half-second increments as described in Section 5.1. 
5.4 ADS-B Sensor Data 
The ADS-B data necessary for position error determination was recorded by the FMS.  Both host 
and intruder latitude and longitude information was interpolated in the same manner as the 
‘truth’ data.  All ADS-B parameters updated simultaneously, so the interpolation was 
accomplished by looking for changes in the latitude data only. 
5.5 TCAS Sensor Data 
The TCAS data necessary for position error determination was also recorded by the FMS.  This 
data, expressed in terms of relative range, bearing, and altitude, was processed using the same 
interpolation methodology used for the ‘truth’ data.  All TCAS parameters updated 
simultaneously, so the interpolation was accomplished by looking for changes in the range data 
only. 
5.6 GCS Data 
The GPS time reference recorded for this data did not use the full GPS timing information, and it 
was recorded as integer seconds only.  Since multiple records with the same integer time stamp 
were recorded, it was impossible to reconcile the data to whole and half seconds.  All parameters 
recorded by the GCS were extracted from the text files and stored in a MS Access database, but 
the data was not used for further analysis.  
5.7 Common Tool Data 
Each CT data file consisted of the data for a particular run during a flight.  The naming 
convention for the files made it easy to correlate them with the run data recorded by the FMS.  
This data provided the only source of data relating to the aural and visual displays presented to 
the pilot.  All parameters in this data were extracted from the text files and stored in a MS Access 
database, but interpolated data was not generated.  Leading edge data was identified for use in 
latency and missed message performance since the GCS data was not suitable.   
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6 Analysis and Results 
6.1 Scope of Analysis 
Analysis of the flight test data was focused on determining values for the metrics listed for the 
test objectives in Table 13.  These would then be used to validate the CCA Performance 
Simulation and SIL.   
 
Table 13.  Scope of Analysis 
Objective  Description Metric  
FSTO-1 Collect data to validate CA sensor models. Range Error 
Azimuth Error 
FSTO-2 Collect data to validate link affect models on the 
transmission of CA sensor data. 
Intruder – Host Latency 
Host – GCS Latency 
(downlink) 
FSTO-3 Collect data to validate the CA display.  
FSTO-4 Collect data to validate operator response to the CA 
display. 
Pilot Reaction Time 
Pilot Response 
FSTO-5 Collect data to validate link affect models on the 
transmission of operator evasion commands to the 
vehicle. 
GCS– Host Latency 
(uplink) 
FSTO-6 Validate the vehicle model during an evasion 
maneuver. 
 
FSTO-7 Collect data to validate the resulting miss distance 
between the UAS and intruder during a collision 
avoidance scenario. 
Point of Closest Approach 
 
For sensor position error calculations (FSTO-1), the Data Analysis Plan (DAP) called for 
collection of truth position data for both aircraft to be used to calculate the actual range and 
bearing between the aircraft for comparison with the values resulting from the sensors.  The UTC 
times at which the sensor updates were recorded on the intruder, host, GCS, and CT were 
planned to provide a complete timeline for determining the delay between the intruder sensor and 
ground pilot display (FSTO-2).   
For determining the pilot reaction time element of the timeline (FSTO-4), the DAP called for 
collecting the time an RA was displayed to the pilot on the CT and the time that a command 
input was received at the GCS.  The pilot response parameter (FSTO-4) compared the CT 
climb/descend rate recommended by the RA with the command input entered by the ground pilot 
to determine if pilot responded properly.   
Determination of the final element of the RA timeline, transmission latency of the command to 
the aircraft (FSTO-5), required the time the command was input at the GCS and the UTC time in 
the FMS that the command was received on the aircraft.  Analysis of the Miss Distance (FSTO-
7) relied on collection of truth position data for the intruder and host to calculate the point of 
closest approach.  Analysis to support FSTO-6 was the responsibility of the Flight IPT, and the 
results of that effort are included in the technical report to be released by the Flight IPT. 
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6.1.1 Run Selection 
Runs were selected for analysis by developing two sets of charts, examples of which are shown 
in Figure 21 and Figure 22.  The first set of four charts depicts Proteus and G-III truth data for 
latitude, longitude, pressure altitude, and range between aircraft.  These charts were reviewed to 
find runs with a relatively consistent rate of change in latitude and longitude indicating limited 
maneuvering during the encounter run-in because simulation of these runs would be easier to 
model.  To simplify modeling, it was also necessary to select runs with limited changes in 
altitude before a RA since the algorithms are dependent on the relative altitude of the intruder.  
Additionally, selection was based on runs with TA and RA events that could be replicated in the 
simulation. 
 
 
Figure 21. Truth Data with Events 
 
The TCAS Track plots were used when selecting TGC runs for analysis.  During planning for the 
flight test, link bandwidth concerns led to the decision to limit intruder tracks recorded by the 
FMS and passed to the GCS to three for both ADS-B and TCAS.  Implementation of the 
selection logic in the Proteus FMS resulted in the possibility that the G-III data could change 
tracks during a run or even not be included in the three tracks selected by the FMS.  A process 
was developed during analysis to determine which of the three tracks, if any, was the G-III.  
 Page 45 of 80 
Figure 22 is an example of a run where the G-III remained in the Intruder 1 track (Blue) and the 
logic correctly identified that track as the G-III (Red).  Appendix D contains the track plots for 
all TGC runs during flight A5-6. 
 
 
Figure 22.  TCAS Track Determination 
 
6.1.2 Limitations 
A complete analysis of the flight test data was not accomplished due in part to the late delivery 
of the Proteus and GCS data by Scaled Composites. Another factor was additional post-
processing requirements that were not originally anticipated in the analysis plan.  Finally, the 
premature termination of the Access 5 program led to an abbreviated analysis of the technology 
demonstration data.  This report identifies recommended areas for follow-on work in the 
conclusions section.  Specific issues discovered during data processing and analysis that limit the 
usefulness of the data are detailed in the following sub-sections.   
6.1.2.1 Data Timing 
During test planning, the Flight IPT and the CCA Work Package made the decision to use GPS-
provided latitude, longitude, and UTC time as ‘truth’ data for both aircraft.  It was assumed that 
using a common position source and timing would permit an accurate calculation of relative 
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position during the runs.  During analysis of ADS-B data range errors, a problem with the timing 
became evident during latency calculations.   
When the comparison was made between the intruder and host times, results showed cases where 
ADS-B position updates were recorded at the host prior to the intruder instrumentation system 
recording that position for the GPS ‘truth’ data.  Realizing that the recorded times for each 
aircraft were instrumentation times and may not reflect the sensor time, it was unclear if there 
was a timing difference between the aircraft or if the instrumentation process on the intruder 
aircraft induced delays in recording the data.  Without a method to isolate the timing errors from 
the total error, the position errors and latency times could not be accurately determined.  
6.1.2.2 FTSO-3 
Although the CCA Work Package developed a Pilot Questionnaire for the ground pilot to 
complete after each run, no specific parameters were developed to validate the CA display.  
Since the flight test used a test-expedient pilot display that was not intended to represent an 
operational system, validation of the display was not attempted during flight test.  Data was 
collected only to potentially identify runs where the pilot had a problem interpreting the display 
so reaction time might not be representative. 
6.1.2.3 GCS Timing Reference 
The GCS timing reference did not include the fractional part of the GPS timing signal and was 
quantized in integer seconds only.  Latency calculations between the aircraft and the ground 
station were approximated the FMS and Common Tool data where accurate timing was 
available. 
6.1.2.4 GCS Pilot Command Input 
The GCS data inadvertently omitted the autopilot parameter that recorded the climb/descent rate 
command entered by the pilot and sent to the aircraft in response to an RA.  Pilot reaction time 
could only be estimated by using the time between the CT display of an RA and when the rate 
command was received by the aircraft FMS and subtracting the downlink time which was 
assumed to be the same as the uplink time.  
6.2 ADS-B Sensor Characterization 
Prior to data analysis, a set of performance metrics was identified to model the ADS-B system in 
the CCA Performance Simulation.  Table 14 lists the metrics and results that were used to set 
Performance Simulation variables characterizing the system.  The data analysis methodology and 
resulting value for each metric are described below. 
The flights selected for analysis of data transmission from the aircraft to the ground station were 
A5-5 and A5-6.  Telemetry (TM) problems identified by the flight test team during earlier flights 
resulted in poor data transmission between the Proteus and ground station that caused 
unrealistically poor performance statistics.  Improvements to the system before the selected 
flights resulted in a better performing TM system representing a reliable though not production-
quality communication system.  Flight test data for all runs used in this analysis was limited to 
the time period that the ground pilot had control of the aircraft. 
For this demonstration, the G-III (intruder) aircraft was generally the only ADS-B equipped 
aircraft within reception range of the Proteus (host) system.  When the G-III ADS-B system was 
detected, the data was collected in the FMS in the Intruder 1 data fields. 
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Table 14.  ADS-B Performance Metrics 
Metric Result  
Intruder-Host Missed Message Rate (%) 6.2% 
Intruder-Host Message Latency (sec) Undetermined 
Range Error (ft) Undetermined 
Azimuth Error (deg) Undetermined 
Relative Altitude (ft) Undetermined 
FMS-CT Missed Message Rate (%) 18.67% 
FMS-CT Transmission Latency (sec) 1.63 
 
6.2.1 Intruder-Host Missed Message Rate 
This metric measures the percentage of the ADS-B position updates in the Proteus GDL 90 
ADS-B system that are based on extrapolated data because of a missed transmission from the 
intruder aircraft.  When an ADS-B intruder message is missed during a time step, the GDL 90 
sets a parameter to indicate the missing update. 
Intruder ADS-B data recorded in the Proteus FMS at 10 Hz contains an integer-value time stamp 
(ADSBTme1) and Data Message Missed (ADSBLMR1) parameter to indicate if a new update 
was received from the intruder.  Since the ADS-B update rate is 1 Hz, the data was limited to 
only the first record for each time step to analyze ADS-B performance and not overall 
transmission quality of the system.   
The Missed Message parameter in the FMS data was evaluated to determine the percentage of 
those updates that were based on extrapolated data during the selected runs, thus determining the 
ratio of missed to total messages.  Table 15 summarizes the missed message data.  
 
Table 15.  ADS-B Missed Message Data 
Intruder-Host Missed Message Rate (%) 
Messages Received -Total 14,736 
Messages Received – No Update 914 
Missed Message Rate 6.2% 
 
6.2.2 Intruder-Host Message Latency 
This value could not be determined because of a suspected timing difference in the G-III 
instrumentation system. 
6.2.3 Range and Azimuth Error  
The G-III ‘truth’ position at a specific time couldn’t be compared to FMS data because of the 
data timing issue.  Therefore, values for range and azimuth error could not be determined.  The 
data was analyzed to determine position errors for each of the aircraft, Table 16.  For the Proteus 
ADS-B versus GPS systems, the data was from the same FMS source, and the error is limited to 
GPS errors only.  The results are well within expected GPS error bands.  For the G-III, ADS-B 
position was taken from the Proteus FMS and the ‘truth’ position from the G-III instrumentation.  
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The error for the G-III reflects the addition of error due to timing differences to normal GPS 
position error.  
 
Table 16.  ADS-B Position Errors 
ADS-B Position Errors (ft) 
Characteristic Proteus G-III 
Mean 26.62 334.74 
Standard Deviation 16.01 79.32 
 
6.2.4 FMS-CT Missed Message Rate 
This metric measures the percentage of Proteus GDL 90 ADS-B position updates recorded by the 
aircraft FMS that were not received by the GCS.  Only the leading edge of each ADS-B latitude 
update was analyzed for the flights following the improvement to the TM system.  For each new 
host latitude value (ADSBLatP) recorded on the aircraft, CT data was searched to see if that 
value was recorded on the ground.  If the value was not recorded, it was considered a missed 
message due to the C2 downlink resulting in the data in Table 17. 
 
Table 17.  ADS-B Downlink Missed Messages 
FMS – CT Downlink Missed Message Rate (%) 
Messages Received -Total 7,273 
Messages Received – New Update 1,358 
Missed Message Rate 18.67% 
 
6.2.5 FMS-CT Message Latency 
Prior to flight test, the DAP called for downlink latency to be measured by the delay between 
recording the data on the aircraft and in the GCS.  Following receipt of the GCS data, it was 
determined the data did not have the fidelity required for this measurement.  Therefore, the 
latency reported for the flight test is between the FMS and the CT and serves as an 
approximation of downlink delay.  As the data was analyzed for missed data, the times for each 
matching pair of data between the FMS and CT were recorded and delay statistics were prepared, 
Table 18.  As in the missed message analysis, only the ADS-B update data for the last two flights 
was used. 
 
Table 18.  ADS-B Downlink Transmission Latency 
FMS-CT Transmission Latency (sec) 
Mean 1.63 
Standard Deviation .45 
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6.3 TCAS Sensor Characterization 
Performance metrics used for TCAS varied slightly from the ADS-B characterization since 
TCAS calculates range, relative altitude, and bearing information on board the host and does not 
receive a position update from the intruder.  Table 19 lists the metrics and results that were used 
to set CCA Performance Simulation variables characterizing the system.  
 
Table 19.  TCAS Performance Metrics 
Metric Result  
TCAS Missed Update Rate (%) Undetermined 
TCAS-FMS Latency (sec) .20 
Range Error (ft) Undetermined 
Azimuth Error (deg) Undetermined 
Relative Altitude (nm) Undetermined 
FMS-CT Missed Message Rate (%) 12.98% 
FMS-CT Transmission Latency (sec) 1.59 
 
The analysis of data transmission from the aircraft to the ground station was restricted to the 
same flights as for ADS-B because the downlink delay was common to both systems.  As 
described in Section 6.1.1, the G-III TCAS data was not consistently on a single track and may 
not have even been recorded during a run.  The runs used in this analysis were limited not only to 
the last two flights, but also to the runs where the G-III track could be clearly identified 
throughout the run.  The smaller sample size led to differences in the FMS to CT statistics 
between the two systems that were not considered statistically significant.  Flight test data for all 
runs used in this analysis was limited to the time period that the Ground Pilot had control of the 
aircraft and CT data was being collected. 
The TCAS analysis was performed in the same manner that the ADS-B data was analyzed, as 
described in the sub-sections below.   
6.3.1 TCAS Missed Update Rate 
An appropriate methodology was not developed to determine this metric as a part of the flight 
test analysis.  An approach was examined to determine the duration that a range value was 
recorded in the FMS and assume that if the range did not change for more than the expected 
update rate, TCAS had missed data.  With the instrumentation recording at 10 Hz and a TCAS 1 
Hz track file update rate, it was anticipated that a new TCAS range would appear every ten 
records.  The data did not follow this simplified expectation and it was unclear if this approach 
would lead to an accurate assessment of TCAS performance.  With limited analysis time, the 
result was therefore undetermined.  
6.3.2 TCAS-FMS Latency 
This metric describes the time delay between the TCAS position update and the time that the 
data is recorded in the FMS at a 10 Hz data rate.  The TCAS time (TCASTme) recorded for each 
of the updates to TCAS range, relative altitude and bearing was compared to the time stamp on 
that record (INS_Time) to determine the delay.  Results are shown in Table 20.   
 Page 50 of 80 
 
 Table 20.  TCAS-FMS Latency 
TCAS-FMS Latency (sec) 
Mean .20 
Standard Deviation .12 
 
6.3.3 Range, Relative Altitude and Azimuth Error 
As with ADS-B, these metrics were undetermined because of the timing issue between the G-III 
and Proteus instrumentation systems.  
6.3.4 FMS-CT Missed Message Rate 
This metric measures the percentage of TCAS position updates recorded by the aircraft FMS that 
were not received by the GCS.  Only the leading edge of each TCAS range update was analyzed 
for the flights following the improvement to the TM system.  The FMS TCAS data was pre-
processed for this analysis to determine which track represented the G-III, and only those runs 
where the G-III data was available for the entire run were used.  The limited number of runs still 
resulted in values that met the expectation that the statistics for transmitting TCAS data to the 
ground would be similar to the statistics for ADS-B.  If a range in the FMS was not recorded in 
the CT, it was considered a missed message due to the C2 downlink.  Table 21 summarizes the 
missed message data.   
 
Table 21.  TCAS Downlink Missed Messages 
FMS – CT Downlink Missed Message Rate (%) 
Track Updates Received -Total 940 
Track Update Missed 122 
Missed Message Rate 12.98% 
 
6.3.5 FMS-CT Message Latency 
As with the ADS-B data, the DAP called for downlink latency to be measured by the delay 
between recording the data on the aircraft and in the GCS, but the GCS data timing fidelity 
required that the CT data be used instead.  Table 22 reflects the delay between matching pairs of 
data in the FMS and CT.  As in the ADS-B analysis, only the data update leading edge for the 
last two flights was used. 
 
Table 22.  TCAS Downlink Transmission Latency 
FMS-CT Transmission Latency (sec) 
Mean 1.59 
Standard Deviation .65 
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6.4 Pilot Model 
The pilot model consists of two metrics, reaction time and response accuracy.  Due to UTC 
timing data fidelity in the GCS, the reaction time is calculated using RA display captured in the 
CT and receipt of the pilot command by the FMS.      
6.4.1 Pilot Reaction Time  
This delay is the sum of the actual pilot response time between observing an RA and inputting 
the command and the C2 uplink latency.  A better estimate for the pilot reaction time can be 
made by assuming the uplink delay is the same as the downlink and subtracting that time from 
the total delay.  The data in Figure 23 shows only runs where a pilot command was sent to the 
aircraft. 
CCA Timeline Latency
(Common Tool RA Display to FMS Command Received)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
3
6
9
-4
3
6
9
-6
3
6
9
-7
3
6
9
-9
3
6
9
-1
1
3
6
9
-1
3
3
6
9
-1
5
3
7
4
-1
3
7
4
-3
3
7
4
-4
3
7
5
-1
3
7
5
-2
3
7
5
-3
3
7
5
-4
3
7
5
-5
3
7
5
-6
3
7
5
-7
3
7
5
-8
3
7
5
-9
3
7
5
-1
0
3
7
5
-1
1
3
7
5
-1
2
3
7
5
-1
3
3
7
5
-1
5
3
7
5
-1
6
3
7
5
-1
7
3
7
5
-1
8
3
7
5
-2
0
3
7
5
-2
2
3
7
5
-2
3
Run
L
a
te
n
c
y
 (
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
Mean - 5.94, Std Dev - 1.57
 
Figure 23.  CCA Timeline Latency (Pilot Reaction + Uplink Latency) 
 
6.4.2 Response Accuracy 
During the flight test, the pilot had a set of discrete command inputs from which to select when 
an RA was displayed. An aural climb command was accompanied by a visual display on the 
Vertical Speed Indicator (VSI) that identified a range of vertical speeds.  The pilot was given 
instructions to respond to an RA with a climb/descend value that fell within that range of vertical 
speeds.  Depending on the command options available and the RA display, the response could be 
at the lowest end of the range or actually higher than commanded.  This was confirmed in the 
data by the response accuracy shown in Table 23.  In all cases, the response was at least the 
commanded value. 
 
Table 23.  Pilot Response Accuracy 
Response Percent 
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< RA Rate of Climb 0 
= RA Rate of Climb 46% 
> RA Rate of Climb 54% 
 
6.5 Simulation Validation 
From the CCA perspective, one of the major goals of the CCA Technology Demonstration was 
to validate the simulation.  With a validated simulation, additional studies can be conducted with 
a higher level of confidence in the results.   
There actually are three CCA simulations:  the Common Tool, the CCA Performance 
Simulation, and the SIL.  Among its many functions, the Common Tool contains a simple 
dynamic model of the Proteus and G-III air vehicles.  Scaled Composites provided the 
characteristics of the Proteus model shown in Table 24, and the Flight IPT used available 
business jet characteristics for the G-III model.  The Flight IPT validated these models following 
the flights.   
 
Table 24.  Proteus Characteristics for Common Tool Simulation Model 
Characteristic Value 
Vmin  90 KIAS 
Vmax  160 KIAS 
Roll rate  5 deg/sec 
Roll acceleration  5 deg/sec/sec 
Nz  2 g 
Nz dot 0.05g/sec 
Climb rate  max 3000 ft/min (highly dependent on ac configuration 
and weight) 
Descent rate  max 2000 ft/min 
Climb onset  accelerating at ~0.05g until commanded VSI obtained 
Descent onset  accelerating at ~0.05g until commanded VSI obtained 
 
The CCA Performance Simulation architecture is shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7.  The CCA 
Performance Simulation contains representations of all the elements of the CCA system, plus 
dynamic models of the ownship and intruders.  A complete description can be found in 
deliverable CCA008-Rev2, CCA Performance Simulation.  The simulation has been validated 
against the technology demonstration flight data to the extent possible, given the quality of the 
data and time constraints on data analysis and simulation modifications.  An attempt has been 
made to model, or at least to provide for, all primary effects.   
The CCA SIL architecture, shown in Figure 13, is very similar to the CCA Performance 
Simulation.  SIL components to be validated include the vehicle dynamics model and 
introduction of errors into the CCA sensors.  Validation of the SIL against both the flight data 
and the CCA Performance Simulation is ongoing.  Results of the SIL validation will be available 
after delivery of this report.   
The simulation validation task has focused on validation of the CCA Performance Simulation 
against the Tech Demo data.  The following subsections address validation of the CCA 
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Performance Simulation exclusively.  Hence, for convenience, references hereafter to “the 
simulation” refer to the CCA Performance Simulation.     
6.5.1 Approach 
The approach taken to validate the simulation involved isolating each component and validating 
it separately, then validating the simulation as a whole.  Validation comprised matching 
simulation results against the data from the flight runs selected as described in Section 6.5.2.  
Validation of the simulation components, ADS-B, TCAS, Data Link, Pilot, and Air Vehicle, is 
described in Sections 6.5.3 through 6.5.7.   
6.5.2 Selected Runs 
The Tech Demo runs selected to use for simulation validation are shown in Table 25.  As 
described in Section 6.1.1, they were chosen based on (1) whether it would be feasible to 
replicate flight paths and TA and RA events in the simulation, and (2) the quality of the data.  
Given that the CCA Performance Simulation did not have all the Proteus and G-III vehicle 
characteristics parameters such as the airframe data and inner loop controller, many of these 
parameters were estimated and obtained from vehicles of similar type and size.  Therefore, the 
simulated flight paths did not match perfectly with the actual path, especially upon a turn, climb, 
descend or roll maneuver.  To replicate the flight paths and TA and RA events to the greatest 
extent possible, the runs with limited changes in altitude and turn maneuver (i.e., linear path) 
before an RA, were selected to minimize the differences between the real and simulated paths.   
 
Table 25.  Tech Demo Runs Used in Simulation Validation 
Flight Run Geometry Sensor / Advisory Buffer Delay Climb Limit 
375 1 1.01 Co-Heading, Co-Altitude TGC 0 0 1000 fpm 
375 2 2.01 Low-Aspect, Co-Altitude TGC 0 0 1000 fpm 
375 4 4.02 Abeam, Co-Altitude TGC 4 0 2500 fpm 
375 5 5.02 Head-On, Co-Altitude TGC 4 0 2500 fpm 
375 6 6.02 Head-On, Host Descending TGC 4 0 2500 fpm 
375 7 4.03 Abeam, Co-Altitude TGC 2 0 2500 fpm 
375 9 5.03 Head-On, Co-Altitude TGC 2 0 2500 fpm 
375 11 6.03 Head-On, Host Descending TGC 2 0 2500 fpm 
375 12 6.04 Head-On, Host Descending TGC 0 0 2500 fpm 
375 13 4.01 Abeam, Co-Altitude TGC 6 0 2500 fpm 
375 15 4.06 Abeam, Co-Altitude TGC 4 2 2500 fpm 
375 17 5.05 Head-On, Co-Altitude TGC 0 0 2500 fpm 
375 18 5.06 Head-On, Co-Altitude TGC 4 2 2500 fpm 
375 19 6.01 Head-On, Host Descending TGC 6 0 2500 fpm 
375 20 6.05 Head-On, Host Descending TGC 0 0 2500 fpm 
375 21 6.06 Head-On, Host Descending TGC 4 2 2500 fpm 
375 23 2.02 Low-Aspect, Co-Altitude AGA 0 0 1000 fpm 
370 2 4.14 Abeam, Co-Altitude TRT 0 2 No Inhibit 
370 6 6.13 Head-On, Host Descending TRT 0 0 No Inhibit 
370 7 6.14 Head-On, Host Descending TRT 0 2 No Inhibit 
369 2 3.03 Co-heading, Intruder Climbing TRT 0 0 Climb Inhibit 
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369 6 4.10 Abeam, Co-Altitude AGA 0 0 2500 fpm 
369 7 5.09 Head-On, Co-Altitude AGA 2 0 2500 fpm 
369 13 4.07 Abeam, Co-Altitude AGA 6 0 2500 fpm 
 
6.5.3 CCA Sensor Performance 
The CCA sensors used in the demonstration were ADS-B and TCAS II.  Currently, each is 
modeled separately in the CCA Performance Simulation.  In general, the CCA sensor errors can 
be modeled in terms of delay, missed data, and measurement error.  Errors for each sensor type 
are modeled separately but in a somewhat similar manner, as described in the subsections below.   
6.5.3.1 Characterizing Errors in the ADS-B Simulation Model 
From the flight data analyses, the ADS-B sensor errors were analyzed and an assessment was 
made to determine if it was necessary to inject the errors into the simulation model so that it 
matched performance in the actual flight configuration. 
As shown in Figure 24 and the more detailed timeline diagram in Appendix F, the ownship’s 
ADS-B receives information on the position of the intruder at time t0, and the ownship’s FMS 
records that position at time t1.  This means that prior to time t0, the intruder arrived at a position 
(at time t-2), and the intruder’s ADS-B recorded that position (at time t-1).  (Times t-2 and t-1 are 
not shown in Figure 24.)  Based on consultation with the ADS-B supplier, Garmin, we expected 
the delay between t-2 and t0 to be about 200 msec.  However, as explained in Section 6.2, a 
possible timing error prevented determination of the actual delay experienced during the 
demonstration.  A provision for the delay is described below; however, for simulation validation 
against flight test, a delay of zero was used.  Future studies will be able to enter a positive delay 
value for sensitivity studies.   
 
t0
Position of Intruder & Host Sensed by ADS -B
t1
Position of Intruder & Host Recorded by FMS
t2
Position of Intruder & Host  Recorded by GCS
t3
Position of Intruder & Host and RA Recorded by CT
t4
VSI Command  Recorded by GCS
t5
VSI Command  Recorded by FMS
 
Figure 24.  Timeline for ADS-B 
 
To inject this delay in the simulation model, a delay function was added inside the CUB module 
as shown in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25.  ADS-B Delay Insertion in CUB Model 
 
However, in the CCA Performance Simulation, the vehicle frame rate is 100 Hz, while the sensor 
models such as the ADS-B and TCAS run at 1 Hz.  The ADS-B model receives data from the 
GPS model, which is derived from the vehicle model.  Due to the architecture setup and the run-
time order of the components, the ADS-B data has an intrinsic lag of 1 second with respect to the 
vehicle model data as seen in the plot shown in Figure 26.   
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Figure 26.  Plot Showing 1-second Intrinsic Delay of ADS-B Data 
 
Another error to be characterized in the ADS-B model is missed data.  In the ADS-B hardware, 
if there is no ADS-B message received for a tracked target, an extrapolated report is generated 
for that target.  The Data Message Missed parameter from the ADS-B hardware indicates a 
missed message from the target.  In its simulation counterpart, the NASA Langley ADS-B model 
generates the Data Message Missed discrete (Good_Send).  This model is in fact a transmission 
and reception model, which is used to characterize the successful reception probability based on 
a number of inputs, such as ownship and intruder position data and other relevant data link 
parameters.  The NASA Langley model purely drives the Good_Send discrete in the current 
ADS-B simulation model and there is currently no way to force the model to replicate the flight 
test Data Message Missed discrete.  Given the fact that the ADS-B missed message rate is only 
6.2%, there is no immediate need to inject such error into the simulation model for analysis.  
However, in the future a missed data block can be provided in the simulation by overriding the 
simulation Good_Send discrete with the Data_Msg_Missed discrete recorded in the flight test as 
shown in Figure 27. 
 
1 second intrinsic delay 
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Figure 27.  Future Insertion of a Missed Data Block 
 
The source of measurement errors for ADS-B is GPS.  The GPS errors can be injected into the 
simulation by utilizing the GPS model feature.  When the GPS model is turned on, noise is added 
to the truth data, which is then subsequently processed by the ADS-B model.  Since in 
simulation, the sources of “truth” data and ADS-B data are both from GPS, and the error for the 
G-III is clouded by data timing differences, for simplicity, the GPS feature is not used for both 
ownship and intruder vehicles. 
To make the ADS-B simulation model perform more closely to the actual hardware, there are a 
couple suggestions that can be considered for future upgrades.  First, the ADS-B pressure 
altitude should be quantized to have a 25-foot resolution, as in the ADS-B hardware.  Second, 
the current ADS-B model does not have any logic to extrapolate the data upon a missed message.    
To solve this, it is recommended that an algorithm to extrapolate intruder data as in the hardware 
be implemented in future versions.   
6.5.3.2 Characterize Errors in the TCAS Simulation Model 
As with ADS-B, the TCAS sensor errors can be characterized in terms of delay, missed data, and 
sensed values.  The analysis of the TCAS sensor errors, however, focused primarily on the 
sensed values, which play a significant role in the TCAS output data error.  As mentioned in 
Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, the TCAS missed update rate is undetermined and the TCAS-FMS 
delay is small (0.2 sec); therefore, the errors due to delay and missed data have not yet been 
modeled. 
Unfortunately, the actual range and azimuth errors experienced in the flight test are also 
undetermined (Section 6.3.3 and Table 19) due to the timing issue between the G-III and Proteus 
instrumentation systems.  However, since data is available, it was used to verify proper 
implementation of the range and bearing errors in the simulation.   
The TCAS sensed values consist of the relative bearing, relative altitude, and range.  From the 
flight test data analysis, the errors between the true and sensed flight data are calculated.  The 
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mean and variance of these errors are then used in the performance simulation to model the 
TCAS noise.  Figure 28 and Figure 29 show the “SensorNoise” blocks where the bias and 
variance parameters are utilized to model the hardware errors.   
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Figure 28.  Sensor Noise Block 
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Figure 29.  Sensor Noise Block Architecture 
 
The purpose of adding errors to the relative bearing, relative altitude and range is to make these 
data match the actual values in the flight test such that the CAS logic would generate similar 
RAs in the simulation as in the actual flight test.  Note that the sensor noise model shown in 
Figure 28 and Figure 29 is a generic Gaussian noise model, which assumes the bias is a constant.  
It is used to model the relative altitude and range errors.  For the relative bearing, however, 
another type of noise model is utilized because the bias is a function of the range between the 
aircraft.  Figure 30 shows the relative bearing sensor noise model, which outputs the bias based 
on the range input. 
 
1
Sensed
EnableNoise
Bias
1
Truth
33
WhiteNoise
Bias
Drif t
 Page 60 of 80 
1
Sensed1
floor
Rounding
Function
Lookup Table
EnableNoise
2
Truth1
1
Range
3
3
3
3 3
3
3
3
3
3
 
Figure 30.  Relative Bearing Sensor Noise Block Architecture 
 
In the CCA Performance Simulation, the errors between the true and sensed relative bearing and 
the corresponding range values are used in the lookup table such that the simulation sensed 
relative bearing has approximately the same error from the true relative bearing as in the flight 
test.  The simulation is now set up to compute the range and azimuth error lookup values up to 
the time when the relative range is 0 nm.  Ideally, the lookup values should be the same for all 
runs.  Due to insufficient good data, no conclusion can be made whether the same look-up values 
can be used for all runs or if they vary based on geometry.  As a result, these lookup values were 
computed for each individual run if the TCAS data is available.  Figure 31 is an example of how 
the injected error allows the sensed relative bearing angle to have a similar error in simulation as 
in the actual hardware.  The errors for the flight test and the simulation are similar.  Please note 
that the time frame of Figure 31 only shows the azimuth plot up to 10 seconds before the range 
reaches 0 nm.   
 
 
Figure 31.  Relative Bearing Plots:  Comparison of Flight Test and Simulation 
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In Figure 31, the values of relative bearing (azimuth) differ between flight test and simulation by 
about 8 degrees.  This difference is the crab angle.  During the flight test, the aircraft was 
crabbed into the wind; however, there is no wind in the simulation, so the aircraft is pointing in 
the same direction as its velocity vector. 
To examine the azimuth accuracy in the simulation, a method for examining the true azimuth, 
expected true azimuth in simulation, crab angle, and the error bands for the true azimuth and 
expected true azimuth was derived for simulation validation.  The definitions of the heading and 
bearing angles are depicted in Figure 32. 
 
N
_ Az_ y
_ x
Az - Azimuth
_ - True Heading
Inertial bearing
 
Figure 32.  Definition of Azimuth and True Heading (No Crab Angle) 
 
As seen in Figure 32, the true azimuth, or relative bearing, from the host to the intruder can be 
written as: 
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where Δx = longitudinal distance in ft 
 Δy = latitudinal distance in ft 
 Ψtrue  = true heading 
The crab angle, which is the difference between the true heading and the velocity vector, is 
defined as: 
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where the heading of the velocity vector, ΨVned can be calculated by taking the inverse tangent of 
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Apply equation (2) to equation (1) in simulation, the equation for the expected azimuth in 
simulation can be written as: 
NEDVectedesim y
x
Az !"##
$
%
&&
'
(
)
)
=
"
"
1
tanxp  
( )anglecrab
y
x
Az trueectedsim _tan
1 !"!##
$
%
&&
'
(
)
)
=
!
!exp  
anglecrabAz
y
x
y
x
Az true
true
true
ectedesim _tantan
11
+!
"
#
$
%
&
'((
)
*
++
,
-
.
.
'((
)
*
++
,
-
.
.
=
''
'xp  
anglecrabAzAz trueectedsim _+=!exp  (4) 
Hardware errors also need to be taken into account for the azimuth accuracy analysis.  Due to the 
GPS errors in the true position, the azimuth true angle should indeed be expressed in terms of a 
band of true azimuth.  Applying a GPS error of 20 feet to both host and intruder GPS errors, the 
latitudinal and longitudinal errors in feet can be assumed to be ft3.282020 22 =+ .  Assuming 
the measurement error of the heading, Ψ, to be approximately 2 degrees, the true azimuth error 
band equations can be written as: 
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where Δxerror = 28.3 ft 
 Δyerror = 28.3 ft 
 Ψerror  = 2 deg 
Figure 33 shows the true azimuth error band, and the errors e1, e2, and e3, which represent the 
range from the sensed azimuth to the error band upper and lower bounds and the true azimuth.  
From equation 4, it is expected to see the azimuth in the simulation to differ from the truth 
azimuth by the crab angle.  Given that the truth azimuth is a band and assuming the crab angle to 
have an error of ± 2 degrees, the expected azimuth in simulation can also be expressed as a band: 
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Figure 33.  Definition of Azimuth Error Band, e1, e2, and e3 
 
Figure 34 further explains how the azimuth model should be validated.  Note that the Azsim_exp 
band should be around 4 degrees wider than the Azture_flight band due to the assumed crab angle 
error.  To make a conclusion that the sensor model is validated, the true azimuth in simulation 
(Aztrue_sim) should be close to Azsim_exp and should lie within the band around Azsim_exp.  The 
second check is if the sensed azimuth in the flight test and simulation differ by approximately the 
crab angle.   
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Figure 34.  Azimuth Analysis to Validate Simulation 
 
A successful example is demonstrated by the case of Flight 375 Run 1 in Figure 35 and Figure 
36.  Aztrue_sim follows closely with Azsim_exp and is within the band.  In Figure 36, the sensed 
azimuth in simulation is greater than its counterpart in the flight test by approximately the crab 
angle.   
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Figure 35.  Flight 375 Run 1 – True Azimuth in simulation Is Within the Band Around 
Azsim_exp 
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Figure 36.  Flight 375 Run 1 – Difference Between Sensed Azimuth in Flight Test and 
Simulation Close to Crab Angle 
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6.5.4 TRT (Onboard TCAS Issuing Advisories) Results 
Runs using TCAS as both sensor and maneuver advisory source provide important simulation 
validation information in two areas:  the timeline for information starting with the ownship’s 
CCA sensor, through the AVCS, and ending back at the ownship responding, and the time/range 
at which a resolution advisory (RA) is issued.  The following sections describe use of this 
information to validate the simulation. 
6.5.4.1 Timeline 
The timeline information from the TRT runs can be used to model the delays associated with the 
pilot and the data link as well as to validate the total system delay.  As shown in Figure 37 and in 
detail in Appendix F, we can follow an RA from the TCAS unit on board the ownship (issued at 
time t0), through recording in the ownship’s FMS (time t1), transmission through the downlink to 
the GCS (recorded at time t2), display and recording in the Common Tool (time t3).  We also see 
the pilot’s reaction to the RA in the form of a VSI command entered at the GCS (time t4), and 
follow it through the uplink to the FMS (time t5).  The aircraft’s response can be seen in terms of 
elevator deflection and altitude change (time t6).   
 
t0
RA Generated by TCAS
t1
RA Recorded by FMS
t2
RA Recorded by GCS
t3
RA Recorded by CT
t4
VSI Command  Recorded by GCS
t5
VSI Command  Recorded by FMS
 
Figure 37.  Timeline for TRT (TCAS-generated RA) Runs 
 
Based on the data analysis (Section 6), we are confident that the time stamps for t1, t3, and t5 
provide both consistency and sufficient accuracy to derive approximations for the pilot 
affirmation time, the uplink and downlink delays, and the overall CCA system time, as shown in 
the equations below. 
downlink time ≈ t3 – t1 
uplink time ≈ downlink time 
pilot affirmation time ≈ t5 – uplink time – t3  
overall CCA system time ≈ t5 – t1. 
Validation of the data link times is described in Section 6.5.6, while validation of the pilot model 
is described in Section 6.5.5.  The overall CCA system time could not be validated because the 
RAs were issued at significantly different times, as explained in Section 6.5.4.2, and of all the 
TRT runs listed in Table 25, the Rate of Climb RA’s were all zeros. 
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6.5.4.2 RA Range  
One way to validate that the TCAS simulation model is working as expected is to assess the 
range or time at which an RA is issued.  For the TRT runs, we found that RAs were not issued at 
the same time in the technology demonstration that they were by the simulation.  Table 26 
provides the validation results.   
 
Table 26.  RA Range Analysis 
Technology 
Demonstration 
Performance 
 Simulation Difference Flight / 
Run Time RA 
Issued, sec 
Range to 
Collision 
Time RA 
Issued, sec 
Range to 
Collision 
Time RA 
Issued, sec 
Range to 
Collision 
370-2 23.35 sec ~ 6593.1 ft 9.64 sec ~ 12293 ft 13.71 sec 5699.9 ft 
370-6 30.65 sec ~ 27078 ft 28.64 sec ~ 29000 ft 2.01 sec 1922 ft 
370-7 37.01 sec ~ 21814 ft 35.64 sec ~23100 ft 1.37 sec 1286 ft 
369-2 23.35 sec ~ 6693 ft 9.64 sec ~ 12405 ft 13.71 sec 5712 ft 
 
The significant differences between the technology demonstration data and the simulation 
presented in Table 26 imply that the TCAS model is not yet validated.  Additional analysis and 
probably model improvements will need to be performed.  The SIL can be used to support this 
future effort.   
6.5.5 Pilot 
The pilot model comprises a decision and a delay, or pilot affirmation time.  The simulation 
currently provides for only the delay, as shown in Figure 38.  In the future, a block can be added 
to set the decision to a percent probability of commanding what is advised and, if not, percent 
probability of commanding more or less than what is advised.  The variable 
OwnshipData.equip.AVCS.PilotAffirm sets the pilot affirmation time in the CCA Performance 
Simulation.   
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Figure 38.  AVCS Pilot Model 
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To allow replication of the flight test runs, CCA Performance Simulation version 2.0 is set up to 
read the pilot affirmation time and delay in the excel spreadsheet TechDemoRuns.xls in the 
..\Simulation\Flight_Demo_Matrices folder for each run. 
 
   
 
Figure 39.  Injection of Pilot Affirmation Time and Delay 
 
The pilot affirmation time data from Figure 23 was used in simulation.  For those cases in which 
the data is not available, the average time of 5.94 sec was used, as shown in Figure 39.  Figure 
40, Figure 41, and Figure 42 show example comparisons of RA recording and VSI command 
between flight data and the simulation for a TRT case. Figure 43, Figure 44, and Figure 45 show 
an example comparison for a non-TRT case.  Note that in Figure 43, the time difference between 
the first Sim VSI Cmd and the first Sim FMS Cmd is around 8.56 sec (128.2-119.64), which is 
very close to its counterpart in the flight test, 8.55 sec (126.852-118.3).   
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Figure 40.  Flight 370 Run 2 - Proteus Altitude  
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Figure 41.  Flight 370 Run 2 - Rate of Climb RA / Command  
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Figure 42.  Flight 370 Run 2 - Resolution Advisories  
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Figure 43.  Flight 375 Run 1 - Proteus Altitude  
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Figure 44.  Flight 375 Run 1 - Rate of Climb RA / Command  
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Figure 45.  Flight 375 Run 1 - Resolution Advisories  
 
6.5.6 Data Link 
The data link consists of the downlink from the ownship to the AVCS and the uplink from the 
AVCS to the ownship.  The simulation assumes that downlink and uplink times are constant 
throughout the run.   
 Page 72 of 80 
6.5.7 Ground CAS Logic 
The Ground CAS Logic issues a maneuver advisory in the TGC and AGA cases.  The same 
ground CAS logic software ran in the Common Tool during the Tech Demo and in the 
simulation.  The correctness of its advisory can be validated by comparing it with the RA 
generated by the onboard TCAS unit in the TGC cases.  In the TGC cases, the RAs generated by 
the onboard TCAS unit were recorded but not displayed.  Figure 46 shows an example. 
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Figure 46.  Flight 375 Run 1 - Rate of Climb RA/Command 
 
It was expected that comparing RAs in the flight data with that in the simulation could validate 
the ground CAS logic.  However, since the tracks in the technology demonstration were 
inconsistent, the advisories issued by the ground CAS logic often did not make sense.  Rather 
than duplicating the tracking problem in the simulation, the simulation outputs from the ground 
CAS logic were only assessed for reasonableness and found to be as expected.   
6.5.8 Air Vehicle Dynamics 
Although validation of the ownship and intruder air vehicle models was the responsibility of the 
Flight IPT, the Proteus and G-III models in the CCA Performance Simulation needed to match 
the paths the vehicles followed in the Tech Demo well enough so that the other simulation 
components could be validated.  To this end, waypoints for the vehicles were derived from the 
recorded positions of the vehicles.  The G-III followed the waypoints for the entire flight, while 
the Proteus followed the waypoints up to the time when the ground pilot issued a VSI command.  
After the VSI command, the Proteus model reacted to the command, replicating the avoidance 
maneuver acceptably.  A full description of the method used to force the simulated vehicles to 
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match the paths of the technology demonstration runs, as well as the model characteristics used, 
can be found in the CCA Performance Simulation User’s Manual, Version 2.0, Section 4.   
6.5.9 Comparison of Performance Simulation & SIL 
Validation of the CCA Performance Simulation against the SIL has been planned but not yet 
executed.  Each element will be isolated, errors will be injected as inputs to the hardware, and 
timelines will be validated.   
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7 Summary and Conclusions 
The test planning, flight operations, data reduction, and simulation validation stages performed 
for the FY05 CCA Technology Demonstration all provided valuable data on UAS collision 
avoidance system performance.  The process also yielded valuable insights into how dependent 
the stages are to each other and how better to perform each process in order to improve the 
quality and efficiency of subsequent efforts.  Many insights have been gained; so the goal of this 
section is to pass the lessons on to possibly facilitate future UAS development efforts.  
Additionally, due to Access 5 programmatics, the project has been terminated before many of the 
analysis and simulation validation efforts could be completed.  The CCA Work Package had 
developed a plan outlining simulation validation and other technology demonstration data 
analysis efforts that were not performed due to insufficient time.  This information also is 
expressed in this document to help future UAS collision avoidance system efforts to focus their 
work.   
7.1 Lessons Learned 
While many of the items below may be better termed ‘lessons relearned’, the CCA Work 
Package feels it is still necessary to reemphasize several key items because of the impact they 
can have on successful conduct of a test effort. 
7.1.1 UAS Collision Avoidance Systems 
• Current collision avoidance systems will need to be adapted for UAS operations or new 
systems developed.  Perhaps the most important lesson learned during the flight 
demonstration is that UAS operations have several unique challenges that will require 
significant changes to existing and emerging systems to maintain an equivalent level of 
safety to manned aircraft.  Without the ability to visually acquire an intruder aircraft, it is 
critical that the collision avoidance recommendation presented by the system is timely 
and even more importantly accurate.  Furthermore, the system needs to integrate well into 
current operations in the NAS and not adversely impact the operation of systems now in 
use. 
• Data latency may force the pilot out of the decision process.  The TCAS system currently 
used has an expected pilot reaction time imbedded in the logic.  UAS beyond line of sight 
communication delays may be equal to or greater than the maximum delay acceptable to 
today’s systems.  The options available are to design a system to provide information to 
the pilot sooner or to autonomously respond to a maneuver recommendation.    
7.1.2 Test Planning  
• Establish and maintain a realistic timeline.  This demonstration was conducted on a 
compressed timeline that forced several efforts to be performed in parallel.  When delays 
occur, the test team and project management must be prepared to shift the entire 
remaining timeline rather than compress subsequent efforts.   
• Ensure close coordination between all team members.  This is important for identifying 
any problems that might arise during the test and working through proper solutions prior 
to data-collection flights. 
• Ensure the Data Analysis Plan (DAP) completely captures each required data parameter 
and fully details the required accuracy.   Successful completion of the DAP ties in closely 
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with the two previous lessons.  It is important that the people who are going to use the 
data for analysis have a good knowledge of the data collection process in order to ensure 
all the necessary information is present.  A well laid out timeline will provide enough 
time to fully outline expected analysis results and coordinate with flight test personnel.    
• Use multiple, accurate sources of truth and timing data in order to characterize latency 
and sensor measurement errors.  For example, truth data for the G-III relied on TSPI data 
for which the time stamp was inconsistent with sensor data recorded on the ownship, 
resulting in lack of complete conclusions about CCA sensor characteristics.  Recording 
the G-III’s ADS-B data would have provided another data source to help track down the 
inconsistency and possibly an alternate method of deriving the G-III’s truth data.   
• The test schedule should allow evaluation of data quality between flights.  When 
command and control link quality was poor during a flight, test runs continued primarily 
to meet the project schedule.  This resulted in data that was of little use.  Also, a software 
error that resulted in intruders not being tracked properly was identified but not fixed 
during the testing; resulting in data that required extra processing and in some cases was 
not useful.  Early review of these problems may have resulted in more useful data. 
7.1.3 Flight Operations 
• Ensure all team members, including the technology developer, are represented on test 
day.  The technology developer must be present and available during the demonstration 
flights to assess data quality and to address any concerns regarding the quality of the data 
collected.  
• Clearly define test performance standards.  This demonstration used encounter 
geometries to generate near-collision scenarios.  Simulation of the runs was complicated 
by maneuvers flown during the encounter to ensure the aircraft passed each other at the 
specified test parameters when emphasis should have been placed on maintaining a stable 
approach that would have facilitated model validation. 
7.1.4 Data Reduction 
• Data responsibilities must be clearly defined during the planning stage.  This is necessary 
for building and testing the software processes and data storage structures in a timely 
manner and avoiding post-flight processing delays.  
• Data delivery schedules must be established and followed.  Timeline compression caused 
by delays in data delivery can seriously affect data analysis quality.  
• Data reduction cannot start with delivery of the first set of test data.  It is critical that the 
test team prepare sample data sets prior to actual flight operations to test data handling 
and reduction.  This can mitigate problems caused by an incomplete parameter list in the 
DAP and by actual data collection errors.  If sample data is not available, allow time to 
perform a preliminary assessment of the data from the first flight before continuing. 
7.1.5 Laboratory Testing to Support the Flight Test 
• Test the closed-loop system in the lab with representations of all flight software and 
hardware and an accurate model of the vehicle dynamics prior to flight test.  Due to time 
constraints and low safety risk, these activities were performed in parallel.  Given access 
to the flight software and/or logic, the problem with TCAS intruder tracking seen in flight 
test would have been identified through lab testing and corrected prior to the flights. 
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• The SIL was used during the flight demonstration to debug issues such as the TCAS ID 
and to update filters in the ground CAS logic.  Sample flight data recorded from test 
flight would have aided in discovery of the filter deficiencies and allowed for more robust 
software to be used throughout all of the flight tests. 
7.1.6 Simulation Validation 
• Isolation of the model components allows each system element to be validated with 
minimal interference from the other components. 
• Direct injection of flight test data into the simulation allows for the easiest replication of 
the flight.  In the future, one helpful simulation improvement would be to bypass the 
vehicle model and use truth position, velocity, and orientation data instead of generating 
waypoints to follow. 
7.2 Future Work 
7.2.1 Complete the Data Analysis 
• Perform additional analyses other than simulation validation, including 
o Did the look-ahead buffer compensate for BLOS data link delay? 
o How did BLOS data link delay affect the CCA system? 
o Compare TGC and TRT to assess the adequacy of a ground CAS algorithm. 
o System latency. 
• Validate the simulation with alternate flight test data as available.  Requires accurate 
“truth” data for intruder.   
o Will allow validation of ADS-B intruder-host message latency, range error, and 
azimuth error. 
o Will allow validation of TCAS missed update rate, range error, azimuth error, and 
relative altitude error. 
• Validate the CCA Performance Simulation against the SIL 
o Complete TCAS and ADS-B model validation 
o Ensure that these two simulations are the same and hence can both be used for 
future analyses. 
• Validate the SIL against flight demo data.  This effort is in progress but needs to be 
completed and documented. 
7.2.2 Pilot and Display 
• Characterize a more accurate pilot model.  The flight test was not conducted under 
operational conditions, there were only three ground pilots, and a select set of encounters 
was flown.  Broader testing can be performed in the SIL and the AVCS.   
• Validate the CCA display, per FSTO-3.  Data could be collected via testing in the SIL. 
• Add pilot decision to the pilot model in the simulation. 
7.2.3 CCA Sensors 
• TCAS: 
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o Analyze RA time/range mismatch between simulation and flight data.  Explain 
the source of the mismatch and, if appropriate, update the simulation model. 
o Analyze altitude discrepancies observed between TCAS data and GPS data.  
o Characterize the effects of the relative altitude measurement. 
• ADS-B model: 
o Insert a missed data block by overriding the simulation Good_Send discrete with 
the Data_Msg_Missed discrete recorded in the flight test. 
o Implement an algorithm to extrapolate the data upon a missed message as in the 
hardware. 
o Quantize the ADS-B pressure altitude to have a 25-ft resolution, as in the ADS_ 
hardware. 
7.2.4 Simulation-Based Sensitivity Studies 
• Use the CCA Performance Simulation and the SIL to perform sensitivity studies on the 
various component characteristics and through a larger variety of encounter scenarios.  
Create a detailed test plan that supports using the results of the studies for safety analysis 
and specification of performance requirements. 
• Create generic CCA sensor models for use in broader sensitivity studies and in the 
AVCS.  Interface these models to the simulation.  Allow for alternate collision avoidance 
logic. 
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8 Definitions and Acronyms 
8.1 Definitions 
 
Alert – Indication (aural or visual) that provides information to the flight crew in a timely manner 
about a converging aircraft or a potential collision. 
Cooperative Traffic – Traffic that broadcasts position or other information, which assists in detecting 
and assessing conflict potential. 
Manned Aircraft – Aircraft that are piloted by a human onboard.  
Resolution Advisory (RA) – Aural voice and display information provided by TCAS-II, advising that 
a particular maneuver should, or should not, be performed to attain or maintain safe separation 
distance from an intruder aircraft.   
Sense and Avoid – The ability to sense traffic which may create a conflict, evaluate flight paths, 
determine traffic right-of-way, and maneuver to avoid other traffic.  
Threat – An intruder aircraft that has satisfied the threat detection logic and thus requires an 
avoidance maneuver 
Traffic – Any air vehicles that might be encountered by the UA. 
Traffic Advisory (TA) – A TCAS-II message given to alert a pilot that another aircraft is within 
detection range. 
UAS – Unmanned Aircraft System.  This includes the UA, the ground control station (which includes 
the human pilot), and all associated communications hardware. 
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8.2 Acronym List 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
CA Collision Avoidance 
CCA Cooperative Collision Avoidance 
CAS Collision Avoidance System 
DoD Department of Defense 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FMS Flight Management System 
FRD Functional Requirements Document 
FSTO Flight (test) Specific Test Objective 
G-III Gulfstream III aircraft 
GCS Ground Control Station 
HALE High Altitude, Long Endurance 
MOA Military Operating Area 
NAS National Airspace System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
OPV Optionally Piloted Vehicle 
RA Resolution Advisory (see Definitions) 
ROA Remotely Operated Aircraft 
SIL Systems Integration Lab 
TA Traffic Advisory (see Definitions) 
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
UA Unmanned Aircraft 
UAS Unmanned Aircraft System 
 
 Page 80 of 80 
Appendices A-G can be found in separate files.   
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Appendix A - Mapping of CCA Objectives to Data 
Analyses 
Objective 
Number 
Question Value / Validity Record Analyze 
Determine effective 
azimuth accuracy 
High. 
Validates 
simulation model 
of TCAS. 
Host location and 
Euler angles 
Intruder location 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
from box 
Calculate true azimuth from 
host to intruder; band with 
GPS error. 
Plot time history of azimuth 
and sensed azimuth; 
compare. 
Develop error band for 
sensed azimuth. 
Determine effective 
relative altitude 
accuracy 
More applicable 
for the sensors 
we used. 
Host and Intruder 
Altitudes 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
from box 
Compare true altitude 
difference with sensed 
altitude difference. 
Determine effective 
elevation accuracy 
High. 
Validates 
simulation model 
of TCAS. 
Host location and 
Euler angles 
Intruder location 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
from box 
Calculate true elevation from 
host to intruder; band with 
GPS error. 
Plot time history of elevation 
and sensed elevation 
compare. 
Develop error band for 
sensed elevation. 
High. 
Answers sub-
question, was 
data provided to 
pilot? 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
coming out of box 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
from DL and @ 
display 
Compare TCAS or ADS-B 
data from all recording points 
to ensure they're the same. 
CGTO-1 
Situational 
awareness provided 
to pilot? 
High. 
Answers 
question 
subjectively. 
Pilot questionnaire. "Were you aware?" 
Track detected 
cooperative traffic? 
Medium. 
Answers 
question, but 
multiple 
intruders, which 
are necessary for 
potentially 
confusing tracks, 
are not 
anticipated. 
intruder location 
host location 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
coming out of box 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
from DL and @ 
display 
Plot comparison of true and 
sensed intruder location 
relative to host for time 
range(s) when traffic was 
detected to ensure that traffic 
was tracked.  Flag any 
missing sensed data.  If 
multiple intruders available, 
flag any data points that 
assign wrong intruder 
number.  Summarize any 
flagged data. 
Is time and position 
of intruder tracked? 
High. 
Answers 
question outright. 
data at display with 
track IDs 
Is a 1-sec update enough? 
intruder location 
host location 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
@ display 
Compare time history of 
intruder position with that 
recorded from display.   
CGTO-2 
Provide position 
information to the 
pilot? 
High.   
Answers 
questions 
outright. 
Pilot questionnaire. Was display of traffic position 
working? 
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Objective 
Number 
Question Value / Validity Record Analyze 
Could the pilot track 
the data? 
Medium.   
Could be a 
function of the 
test. 
Pilot questionnaire. Could you track the 
intruders? 
High. 
Provides insight 
into aggregate 
position accuracy 
given all the 
latencies in the 
system.  
However, TCAS 
installation is 
expected to 
produce best-
possible results, 
so this data only 
bounds TCAS 
accuracy at the 
"good" end. 
intruder location 
host location 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
coming out of box 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
from DL and @ 
display 
Plot comparison of true and 
sensed intruder location 
relative to host as a function 
of time (or time tag) for time 
range(s) when traffic was 
detected.  Assess time 
differential against expected 
data latency between each 
point.  Compare true and 
sensed position (without 
adjusting for the time 
differential) by plotting 
difference as a function of 
time (or time tag) and by 
calculating statistical data 
(mean, standard deviation) of 
difference.  Compare 
statistical data on difference 
against expected errors for 
the equipment.   
CGTO-2 
Determine track 
accuracy of sensed 
time and position of 
intruder 
High. 
Validates 
simulation 
model. 
intruder location 
host location 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
coming out of box 
TCAS or ADS-B data 
from DL and @ 
display 
Latency assessment.  
Characterize time delay 
between true and displayed 
intruder location. 
Determine collision 
potential with 
detected 
cooperative traffic  
Medium. 
Answers 
question of did 
system perform 
as expected, but 
tests are limited 
in quantity. 
For each alert and 
warning, what were 
the conditions 
(range, bearing, 
relative altitude, 
closing velocity, 
vertical velocity) 
How does range and/or time 
at which  advisory was 
issued compare with that 
expected from onboard 
TCAS II?  
Provide notification 
of potential collision 
to pilot? 
Low All advisories at 
display 
Plot time history of 
advisories.  Was a maneuver 
advisory preceded by an 
alert? 
CGTO-3 
Observe  
information 
presented to the 
ROA pilot that 
conveys collision 
potential 
Low Alerts (visual and 
aural) @ display 
Tester observations 
Run data through display 
software post-test if 
necessary to observe. 
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Objective 
Number 
Question Value / Validity Record Analyze 
CGTO-3 Demonstrate utility 
of the CCA 
subsystem alert that 
notifies the ROA 
pilot of a potential 
collision threat 
Low Pilot behavior May be difficult to glean, 
except through scribe notes 
and pilot VSI commands. 
CGTO-4 Demonstrate the 
utility of a CCA 
subsystem 
recommended 
evasive maneuver 
Medium. 
Partially a 
function of the 
test. 
In cases in which we 
had a 2nd climb 
command, record  
intruder location 
host location 
 
Why was there a 2nd climb 
command? 
CGTO-5 Determine the time 
required for the ROA 
pilot to perform an 
evasive maneuver 
after the CCA 
subsystem has 
notified the ROA 
pilot of a potential 
collision 
Low.   
Gives some 
indication of pilot 
response model, 
but these are 
ideal conditions. 
Alert 
Pilot command at 
GCS 
Pilot response time 
Demonstrate the 
ability to assess the 
adequacy of the 
maneuver and 
determine that the 
collision potential 
has been avoided 
High.   
Answers 
questions 
outright. 
All Clear signal 
intruder location 
host location 
Was an "all clear" given after 
the collision potential 
passed? 
CGTO-6 
Determine that the 
evasive maneuver 
maintains separation 
from the threat 
aircraft 
High. 
Answers 
question outright. 
All Clear signal 
intruder location 
host location 
Miss distance; Plot relative 
locations with time, and 
assess unexpected 
maneuvers. 
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Appendix B – Parameter Lists 
 
Flight 369+ FMS Parameter List 
Field Parameter Description/Units 
1 ElapsedTime[sec] Elapsed Time, seconds 
2 msg270010cnt message 27 10Hz counter 
3 LAIL left aileron position, deg 
4 PTRIM pitch trim position, deg 
5 ELEV elevator position, radians 
6 msg270001cnt message 27 1Hz counter 
7 LRUD left rudder position, deg 
8 msg760010cnt message 76 10Hz counter 
9 LPLA left power lever angle, deg 
10 RPLA right power lever angle, deg 
11 msg340001cnt message 34 1Hz counter 
12 TOAT Total temperature, deg F 
13 GPS_Lat Aircraft latitude, degrees 
14 GPS_Long Aircraft longitude, degrees 
15 GPSTrack Aircraft ground track, deg magnetic 
16 GPSGSpd Aircraft ground speed, knots 
17 GPSDistNextWpt GPS Distance to next waypoint, nmi * 10 
18 msg220010cnt message 22 10Hz counter 
19 APENGAGE Autopilot engage status, VDC (on > 2.5 VDC) 
20 msg340010cnt message 34 10Hz counter 
21 INS_Pitch Aircraft Pitch Attitude, degrees (negative is nose down) 
22 INS_Roll Aircraft roll attitude, degrees (right roll is positive) 
23 INS_Heading Aircraft Heading relative to True North (positive values represent clockwise 
angle relative to North) 
24 INS_Lat Aircraft Latitude, degrees (referenced to WGS-84 map datum) 
25 INS_Lon Aircraft Longitude, degrees  (referenced to WGS-84 map datum) 
26 INS_Altitude Aircraft altitude, feet  (referenced to WGS-84 map datum) 
27 INS_mode INS Mode (1 = Test, 2 = Init, 3 = (Not Used), 4 = Fine Alignment, 5 = Air 
Alignment, 6 = Transfer Alignment, 7 = Air Navigation, 8 = Land 
Navigation, 9 = GPS Only)  
28 INS_VelN Velocity North, ft/sec 
29 INS_VelE Velocity East, ft/sec 
30 INS_VelD Velocity Down, ft/sec 
31 PSTAT1 Static pressure, psf 
32 PDYN1 Dynamic pressure, psf 
33 msg220001cnt message 22 10Hz counter 
34 TM_CMD_HDG GCS commanded aircraft heading, degrees true 
35 TM_CMD_ALT GCS commanded aircraft altitude, feet (WGS84 datum) 
36 TM_CMD_VSI GCS commanded rate of climb/descent, ft/min 
37 TM_Direct_Cmd Counter incremented with each new GCS "Direct" command 
38 msg850010cnt message 85 10Hz counter 
39 ADSB_INT ADSB Number of Intruders (maximum of 3) 
40 ADSBTmeP ADS-B Host Time Stamp, Seconds since UTC midnight 
41 ADSBInt1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Vehicle ID , 0 to 2E24 
42 ADSBLat1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Latitude, WGS84 deg 
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Field Parameter Description/Units 
43 ADSBLng1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Longitude, WGS84 deg 
44 ADSBAlt1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Altitude, pressure altitude ft 
45 ADSBVVl1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Vertical Velocity, ft/min (up is positive) 
46 ADSBLMR1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Data Message Missed, (TRUE = Data contained in report 
is extrapolated 
FALSE = Actual message contained in report) 
47 ADSBInt2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Vehicle ID , 0 to 2E24 
48 ADSBLat2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Latitude, WGS84 deg 
49 ADSBLng2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Longitude, WGS84 deg 
50 ADSBAlt2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Altitude, pressure altitude ft 
51 ADSBVVl2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Vertical Velocity, ft/min (up is positive) 
52 ADSBLMR2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Data Message Missed, (TRUE = Data contained in report 
is extrapolated 
FALSE = Actual message contained in report) 
53 ADSBInt3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Vehicle ID , 0 to 2E24 
54 ADSBLat3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Latitude, WGS84 deg 
55 ADSBLng3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Longitude, WGS84 deg 
56 ADSBAlt3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Altitude, pressure altitude ft 
57 ADSBVVl3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Vertical Velocity, ft/min (up is positive) 
58 ADSBLMR3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Data Message Missed, (TRUE = Data contained in report 
is extrapolated 
FALSE = Actual message contained in report) 
59 ADSBPRTS ADS-B Host Vehicle ID, 0 to 2E24 
60 ADSBLatP ADS-B Host Latitude, WGS84 deg 
61 ADSBLngP ADS-B Host Longitude, WGS84 deg 
62 ADSBAltP ADS-B Host Altitude, pressure altitude ft 
63 ADSBVVlP ADS-B Host Vertical Velocity, ft/min (up is positive) 
64 ADSBLMRP ADS-B Host Data Message Missed, (TRUE = Data contained in report is 
extrapolated 
FALSE = Actual message contained in report) 
65 ADSBTme1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Time Stamp, Seconds since UTC midnight 
66 ADSBTme2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Time Stamp, Seconds since UTC midnight 
67 ADSBTme3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Time Stamp, Seconds since UTC midnight 
68 msg860010cnt message 86 10Hz counter 
69 TCAS_INT TCAS Number of Intruders (maximum of 3) 
70 RA_Climb Host TCAS RA Climb, Range: 0 to 7 
2 = Climb 
71 RA_Dscnd Host TCAS RA Descend, Range: 0 to 7 
2 = Descend 
72 RA_AltRt Host TCAS RA Altitude Rate Goal, ft/min 
73 RA_VrtCt Host TCAS RA Vertical Control, Range: 0 to 7 
74 RA_CmbCt Host TCAS RA Combined Control, Range: 0 to 7 
0 = No Advisory 
1 = Up Advisory Corrective 
3 = Preventive 
4 = Clear of Conflict 
5 = Down Advisory Corrective 
75 TCASInt1 TCAS Intruder 1 ID, set to 2 on aircraft 
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Field Parameter Description/Units 
76 TCASTme1 TCAS Intruder 1 Timestamp, seconds since UTC midnight 
77 TCASRng1 TCAS Intruder 1 Relative Range, nmi 
78 TCASBrg1 TCAS Intruder 1 Relative Bearing, deg 
79 TCASRAl1 TCAS Intruder 1 Relative Altitude, ft 
80 TCASArr1 TCAS Intruder 1 Display Arrow, 0 = None  
1 = Up  
2 = Down 
81 TCASACd1 TCAS Intruder 1 Advisory Code, 0 = Other Traffic 
1 = Potential Threat 
2 = Threat 
3 = Proximate Traffic 
82 TCASInt2 TCAS Intruder 2 ID, set to 3 on aircraft 
83 TCASTme2 TCAS Intruder 2 Timestamp, seconds since UTC midnight 
84 TCASRng2 TCAS Intruder 2 Relative Range, nmi 
85 TCASBrg2 TCAS Intruder 2 Relative Bearing, deg 
86 TCASRAl2 TCAS Intruder 2 Relative Altitude, ft 
87 TCASArr2 TCAS Intruder 2 Display Arrow, 0 = None  
1 = Up  
2 = Down 
88 TCASACd2 TCAS Intruder 2 Advisory Code, 0 = Other Traffic 
1 = Potential Threat 
2 = Threat 
3 = Proximate Traffic 
89 TCASInt3 TCAS Intruder 3 ID, set to 4 on aircraft 
90 TCASTme3 TCAS Intruder 3 Timestamp, seconds since UTC midnight 
91 TCASRng3 TCAS Intruder 3 Relative Range, nmi 
92 TCASBrg3 TCAS Intruder 3 Relative Bearing, deg 
93 TCASRAl3 TCAS Intruder 3 Relative Altitude, ft 
94 TCASArr3 TCAS Intruder 3 Display Arrow, 0 = None  
1 = Up  
2 = Down 
95 TCASACd3 TCAS Intruder 3 Advisory Code, 0 = Other Traffic 
1 = Potential Threat 
2 = Threat 
3 = Proximate Traffic 
96 TCASSSM1 Host TCAS Intruder 1 Data Status, 0 = Failure Warning 
1 = Functional Test 
2 = No Computed Data 
3 = Normal Operation 
97 TCASSSM2 Host TCAS Intruder 2 Data Status, 0 = Failure Warning 
1 = Functional Test 
2 = No Computed Data 
3 = Normal Operation 
98 TCASSSM3 Host TCAS Intruder 3 Data Status, 0 = Failure Warning 
1 = Functional Test 
2 = No Computed Data 
3 = Normal Operation 
Source:  Scaled Composites data file, Flt369_A5_FMS_Channel_List.xls 
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Flight 369+ GCS Parameter List 
Field Parameter Description/Units 
1 GPS16TIME GPS Time, HHMMSS 
2 PSTAT1 Static pressure, psf 
3 PDYN1 Dynamic pressure, psf 
4 INS_PitchAttitude1 Aircraft Pitch Attitude, degrees (negative is nose down) 
5 INS_RollAttitude1 Aircraft roll attitude, degrees (right roll is positive) 
6 INS_HeadingTrue1 Aircraft Heading relative to True North (positive values represent clockwise 
angle relative to North) 
7 INS_Lat1 Aircraft Latitude, degrees (referenced to WGS-84 map datum) 
8 INS_Long1 Aircraft Longitude, degrees  (referenced to WGS-84 map datum) 
9 INS_Altitude1 Aircraft altitude, feet  (referenced to WGS-84 map datum) 
10 INS_mode INS Mode (1 = Test, 2 = Init, 3 = (Not Used), 4 = Fine Alignment, 5 = Air 
Alignment, 6 = Transfer Alignment, 7 = Air Navigation, 8 = Land 
Navigation, 9 = GPS Only)  
11 INS_VelN Velocity North, ft/sec 
12 INS_VelE Velocity East, ft/sec 
13 INS_VelD Velocity Down, ft/sec 
14 TM_CMD_HDG GCS commanded aircraft heading, degrees true 
15 TM_CMD_ALT GCS commanded aircraft altitude, feet (WGS84 datum) 
16 TM_Hdg_mode Discrete, on when GCS pilot engages autopilot 
17 TM_Dir_Msg_Num Counter incremented with each new GCS "Direct" command 
18 TCAS_INT TCAS Number of Intruders (maximum of 3) 
19 RA_AltRt Host TCAS RA Altitude Rate Goal, ft/min 
20 RA_Climb Host TCAS RA Climb, Range: 0 to 7 
4 = Climb 
21 RA_CmbCt Host TCAS RA Combined Control, Range: 0 to 7 
0 = No Advisory 
1 = Up Advisory Corrective 
3 = Preventive 
4 = Clear of Conflict 
5 = Down Advisory Corrective 
22 RA_Dscnd Host TCAS RA Descend, Range: 0 to 7 
4 = Descend 
23 RA_VrtCt Host TCAS RA Vertical Control, Range: 0 to 7 
24 TCASInt1 TCAS Intruder 1 ID, set to 2 on aircraft 
25 TCASTme1 TCAS Intruder 1 Timestamp, seconds since UTC midnight 
26 TCASRng1 TCAS Intruder 1 Relative Range, nmi 
27 TCASBrg1 TCAS Intruder 1 Relative Bearing, deg 
28 TCASRAl1 TCAS Intruder 1 Relative Altitude, ft 
29 TCASArr1 TCAS Intruder 1 Display Arrow, 0 = None  
1 = Up  
2 = Down 
30 TCASACd1 TCAS Intruder 1 Advisory Code, 0 = Other Traffic 
1 = Potential Threat 
2 = Threat 
3 = Proximate Traffic 
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Field Parameter Description/Units 
31 TCASSSM1 Host TCAS Intruder 1 Data Status, 0 = Failure Warning 
1 = Functional Test 
2 = No Computed Data 
3 = Normal Operation 
32 TCASInt2 TCAS Intruder 2 ID, set to 3 on aircraft 
33 TCASTme2 TCAS Intruder 2 Timestamp, seconds since UTC midnight 
34 TCASRng2 TCAS Intruder 2 Relative Range, nmi 
35 TCASBrg2 TCAS Intruder 2 Relative Bearing, deg 
36 TCASRAl2 TCAS Intruder 2 Relative Altitude, ft 
37 TCASArr2 TCAS Intruder 2 Display Arrow, 0 = None  
1 = Up  
2 = Down 
38 TCASACd2 TCAS Intruder 2 Advisory Code, 0 = Other Traffic 
1 = Potential Threat 
2 = Threat 
3 = Proximate Traffic 
39 TCASSSM2 Host TCAS Intruder 2 Data Status, 0 = Failure Warning 
1 = Functional Test 
2 = No Computed Data 
3 = Normal Operation 
40 TCASInt3 TCAS Intruder 3 ID, set to 4 on aircraft 
41 TCASTme3 TCAS Intruder 3 Timestamp, seconds since UTC midnight 
42 TCASRng3 TCAS Intruder 3 Relative Range, nmi 
43 TCASBrg3 TCAS Intruder 3 Relative Bearing, deg 
44 TCASRAl3 TCAS Intruder 3 Relative Altitude, ft 
45 TCASArr3 TCAS Intruder 3 Display Arrow, 0 = None  
1 = Up  
2 = Down 
46 TCASACd3 TCAS Intruder 3 Advisory Code, 0 = Other Traffic 
1 = Potential Threat 
2 = Threat 
3 = Proximate Traffic 
47 TCASSSM3 Host TCAS Intruder 3 Data Status, 0 = Failure Warning 
1 = Functional Test 
2 = No Computed Data 
3 = Normal Operation 
48 ADSB_INT ADSB Number of Intruders (maximum of 3) 
49 ADSBAltP ADS-B Host Altitude, pressure altitude ft 
50 ADSBLMRP ADS-B Host Data Message Missed, (TRUE = Data contained in report is 
extrapolated 
FALSE = Actual message contained in report) 
51 ADSBLatP ADS-B Host Latitude, WGS84 deg 
52 ADSBLngP ADS-B Host Longitude, WGS84 deg 
53 ADSBTmeP ADS-B Host Time Stamp, Seconds since UTC midnight 
54 ADSBVVlP ADS-B Host Vertical Velocity, ft/min (up is positive) 
55 ADSBAlt1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Altitude, pressure altitude ft 
56 ADSBLMR1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Data Message Missed, (TRUE = Data contained in 
report is extrapolated 
FALSE = Actual message contained in report) 
57 ADSBLat1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Latitude, WGS84 deg 
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Field Parameter Description/Units 
58 ADSBLng1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Longitude, WGS84 deg 
59 ADSBTme1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Time Stamp, Seconds since UTC midnight 
60 ADSBVVl1 ADS-B Intruder 1 Vertical Velocity, ft/min (up is positive) 
61 ADSBAlt2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Altitude, pressure altitude ft 
62 ADSBLMR2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Data Message Missed, (TRUE = Data contained in 
report is extrapolated 
FALSE = Actual message contained in report) 
63 ADSBLat2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Latitude, WGS84 deg 
64 ADSBLng2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Longitude, WGS84 deg 
65 ADSBTme2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Time Stamp, Seconds since UTC midnight 
66 ADSBVVl2 ADS-B Intruder 2 Vertical Velocity, ft/min (up is positive) 
67 ADSBAlt3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Altitude, pressure altitude ft 
68 ADSBLMR3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Data Message Missed, (TRUE = Data contained in 
report is extrapolated 
FALSE = Actual message contained in report) 
69 ADSBLat3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Latitude, WGS84 deg 
70 ADSBLng3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Longitude, WGS84 deg 
71 ADSBTme3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Time Stamp, Seconds since UTC midnight 
72 ADSBVVl3 ADS-B Intruder 3 Vertical Velocity, ft/min (up is positive) 
73 VSI Command 
Counter 
Counter incremented with each new GCS "VSI" command 
Source:  Scaled Composites data file, Flt369_A5_GCS_Channel_List.xls 
 
 
 
 
Proteus GPS Parameter List 
Field Parameter Units 
1   GPS TIME  SEC          
2   LATITUDE  DEG          
3   LONGITUDE  DEG         
4   ALTITUDE MSL  FT       
5   VELOCITY NORTH  FT/SEC 
6   VELOCITY EAST  FT/SEC 
7   VELOCITY DOWN  FT/SEC 
Source:  Scaled Composites data files, fltXXX_raw_gps.txt (Where XXX is the Proteus flight 
number) 
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Common Tool Parameter List 
Field Parameter FMS Cross Reference, where available 
1 CTtime   
2 D6Time   
3 D6TFrame   
4 RTError   
5 RTPercent   
6 AltRef   
7 Lonstk_in   
8 LonstkTrm_in   
9 LonstkAP_in   
10 Latstk_in   
11 LatstkTrm_in   
12 LatstkAP_in   
13 Dir_in   
14 DirTrm_in   
15 DirAP_in   
16 APCmd   
17 AllAutopilot   
18 NzCommand   
19 DSixLatitude   
20 DSixLongitude   
21 NumIntruders   
22 DSixVehID   
23 WWIntruderID   
24 UseNetIntrData   
25 WWIntruderVt   
26 RelativeAltIC   
27 RelativeICsFlag   
28 RelativeRangeIC   
29 RelativeBearingIC   
30 RelativeVelocityIC   
31 RelativeHeadingIC   
32 UseRegurgatime   
33 UseGPSTime   
34 UseLocalTime   
35 Access5Time   
36 GPS_PPS   
37 GPSUTCsec   
38 GPSUTCmsec   
39 HOSTLat   
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Field Parameter Description/Units 
40 HOSTLong   
41 HOSTAlt   
42 HOSTVehID   
43 HOSTPsi   
44 AdsbOn   
45 CasLogicOn   
46 AaAllClear   
47 AaDescend   
48 AaClimb   
49 AaVerticalSpeed   
50 VSIptr   
51 RaAltRateGoal   
52 RaVerticalControl   
53 RaClimb   
54 RaDescend   
55 TcasRange5   
56 TcasRange10   
57 TcasRange20   
58 TcasRange40   
59 Intr1VehID   
60 Intr2VehID   
61 Intr3VehID   
62 Intr1Range   
63 Intr2Range   
64 Intr3Range   
65 Intr1Bearing   
66 Intr2Bearing   
67 Intr3Bearing   
68 Intr1RelAlt   
69 Intr2RelAlt   
70 Intr3RelAlt   
71 Intr1AdvisoryCode   
72 Intr2AdvisoryCode   
73 Intr3AdvisoryCode   
74 Intr1DisplayArrow   
75 Intr2DisplayArrow   
76 Intr3DisplayArrow   
77 TaIpx1   
78 TaIpx2   
79 TaIpx3   
80 TaIpy1   
81 TaIpy2   
82 TaIpy3   
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Field Parameter Description/Units 
83 TaIpz1   
84 TaIpz2   
85 TaIpz3   
86 TaSqU1Vis   
87 TaSqU2Vis   
88 TaSqU3Vis   
89 TaSqD1Vis   
90 TaSqD2Vis   
91 TaSqD3Vis   
92 TaSqN1Vis   
93 TaSqN2Vis   
94 TaSqN3Vis   
95 TaUDiaU1Vis   
96 TaUDiaU2Vis   
97 TaUDiaU3Vis   
98 TaUDiaD1Vis   
99 TaUDiaD2Vis   
100 TaUDiaD3Vis   
101 TaUDiaN1Vis   
102 TaUDiaN2Vis   
103 TaUDiaN3Vis   
104 TaUDiaNN1Vis   
105 TaUDiaNN2Vis   
106 TaUDiaNN3Vis   
107 TaSqNN1Vis   
108 TaSqNN2Vis   
109 TaSqNN3Vis   
110 TaTrN1Vis   
111 TaTrN2Vis   
112 TaTrN3Vis   
113 UseUDP   
114 OriginID   
115 TcasDisplayRange   
116 CTVersionID   
117 CmdIpAddress1   
118 CmdIpAddress2   
119 CmdIpAddress3   
120 CmdIpAddress4   
121 CmdIpPort   
122 TaHdg1   
123 TaHdg2   
124 TaHdg3   
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Field Parameter Description/Units 
125 UseDirectionPtr   
126 SideslipOn   
127 OwnshipRotateAngl   
128 RaIncDiveArcOn   
129 RaIncClimbArcOn   
130 CmdAircraftID   
131 CmdAirspeed Host Airspeed 
132 CmdAltitude Host Altitude 
133 CmdCommandID GCS CommandID 
134 CmdHeading Host Heading 
135 CmdRateOfClimb Host Rate_of_Climb 
136 DoAutoManeuver   
137 AaClimbCross   
138 AaDescendCross   
139 RaLimitClimbArcOn   
140 RaLimitDiveArcOn   
141 RaGreenArcOn   
142 HOSTRoc   
143 RaTimeBufferSec CAS Algorithm Buffer Setting 
144 RaCombControl   
145 ClimbRatefpm   
146 HOSTSource   
147 AdsbHostAcNum ADS-B Host Vehicle ID  
148 AdsbHostTime ADS-B Host Time Stamp 
149 AdsbHostDataMiss ADS-B Host Data Message Missed 
150 AdsbHostLat ADS-B Host Latitude 
151 AdsbHostLong ADS-B Host Longitude 
152 AdsbHostAlt ADS-B Host Altitude 
153 AdsbHostVertVel ADS-B Host Vertical Velocity 
154 AdsbIntr1AcNum ADS-B Intruder 1 Vehicle ID  
155 AdsbIntr2AcNum ADS-B Intruder 2 Vehicle ID  
156 AdsbIntr3AcNum ADS-B Intruder 3 Vehicle ID  
157 AdsbIntr1Time ADS-B Intruder 1 Time Stamp 
158 AdsbIntr2Time ADS-B Intruder 2 Time Stamp 
159 AdsbIntr3Time ADS-B Intruder 3 Time Stamp 
160 AdsbIntr1DataMiss ADS-B Intruder 1 Data Message Missed 
161 AdsbIntr2DataMiss ADS-B Intruder 2 Data Message Missed 
162 AdsbIntr3DataMiss ADS-B Intruder 3 Data Message Missed 
163 AdsbIntr1Lat ADS-B Intruder 1 Latitude 
164 AdsbIntr2Lat ADS-B Intruder 2 Latitude 
165 AdsbIntr3Lat ADS-B Intruder 3 Latitude 
166 AdsbIntr1Long ADS-B Intruder 1 Longitude 
167 AdsbIntr2Long ADS-B Intruder 2 Longitude 
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Field Parameter Description/Units 
168 AdsbIntr3Long ADS-B Intruder 3 Longitude 
169 AdsbIntr1Alt ADS-B Intruder 1 Altitude 
170 AdsbIntr2Alt ADS-B Intruder 2 Altitude 
171 AdsbIntr3Alt ADS-B Intruder 3 Altitude 
172 AdsbIntr1VertVel ADS-B Intruder 1 Vertical Velocity 
173 AdsbIntr2VertVel ADS-B Intruder 2 Vertical Velocity 
174 AdsbIntr3VertVel ADS-B Intruder 3 Vertical Velocity 
175 AdsbNumIntruders ADS-B Number of Intruders 
176 TcasIntr1AcNum Host TCAS Intruder 1 ID 
177 TcasIntr2AcNum Host TCAS Intruder 2 ID 
178 TcasIntr3AcNum Host TCAS Intruder 3 ID 
179 TcasIntr1Time Host TCAS Intruder 1 Timestamp 
180 TcasIntr2Time Host TCAS Intruder 2 Timestamp 
181 TcasIntr3Time Host TCAS Intruder 3 Timestamp 
182 TcasIntr1Range Host TCAS Intruder 1 Relative Range 
183 TcasIntr2Range Host TCAS Intruder 2 Relative Range 
184 TcasIntr3Range Host TCAS Intruder 3 Relative Range 
185 TcasIntr1Bearing Host TCAS Intruder 1 Relative Bearing 
186 TcasIntr2Bearing Host TCAS Intruder 2 Relative Bearing 
187 TcasIntr3Bearing Host TCAS Intruder 3 Relative Bearing 
188 TcasIntr1RelAlt Host TCAS Intruder 1 Relative Altitude 
189 TcasIntr2RelAlt Host TCAS Intruder 2 Relative Altitude 
190 TcasIntr3RelAlt Host TCAS Intruder 3 Relative Altitude 
191 TcasIntr1DispArrow Host TCAS Intruder 1 Display Arrow 
192 TcasIntr2DispArrow Host TCAS Intruder 2 Display Arrow 
193 TcasIntr3DispArrow Host TCAS Intruder 3 Display Arrow 
194 TcasIntr1AdvCode Host TCAS Intruder 1 Advisory Code 
195 TcasIntr2AdvCode Host TCAS Intruder 2 Advisory Code 
196 TcasIntr3AdvCode Host TCAS Intruder 3 Advisory Code 
197 TcasIntr1DataStat Host TCAS Intruder 1 Data Status 
198 TcasIntr2DataStat Host TCAS Intruder 2 Data Status 
199 TcasIntr3DataStat Host TCAS Intruder 3 Data Status 
200 TcasNumIntruders Host TCAS Number of Intruders 
201 TcasSourceCas Host TCAS Source CAS 
202 OwnshipAircraftID Host Nav Vehicle ID 
203 OwnshipTime Host Nav Timestamp 
204 OwnshipLat Host Nav Sensed Latitude 
205 OwnshipLong Host Nav Sensed Longitude 
206 OwnshipAlt Host Nav Sensed Altitude 
207 OwnshipVelNorth Host Nav Sensed Velocity North 
208 OwnshipVelEast Host Nav Sensed Velocity East 
209 OwnshipVertVel Host Nav Sensed Vertical Velocity 
210 OwnshipEulerRoll Host Nav Sensed Roll Angle 
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Field Parameter Description/Units 
211 OwnshipEulerPitch Host Nav Sensed Pitch Angle 
212 OwnshipTrueHead Host Nav Sensed Heading 
213 TcasRaClimb Host TCAS RA Climb 
214 TcasRaDescend Host TCAS RA Descend 
215 TcasRaAltRate Host TCAS RA Altitude Rate Goal 
216 TcasRaVertCtrl Host TCAS RA Vertical Control 
217 TcasRaCombCtrl Host TCAS RA Combined Control 
218 MinimumSeparation   
219 CmdTime Host Time 
220 RaDelay   
221 RaDelayCount   
222 RaMaxVertfpm CAS Algorithm Climb Limit Setting 
223 GroundCasReset   
224 FltTst3dDisp   
Source:  Lockheed Martin data file, DSixVariables_tracebility_to_CCAPL.xls 
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G-III Parameter List 
Field Parameter 
1 0000XXadc1_ias 
2 0000XXadc1_palt 
3 0000XXadc1_tas 
4 0000XXadc1_tat 
5 0000XXadc1_vert_spd 
6 0000XXadc2_ias 
7 0000XXadc2_palt 
8 0000XXadc2_tas 
9 0000XXadc2_tat 
10 0000XXadc2_vert_spd 
11 0000XXday 
12 0000XXday_of_year 
13 0000XXfms1_grnd_spd 
14 0000XXfms1_lat 
15 0000XXfms1_lon 
16 0000XXfms1_pres_alt 
17 0000XXfms1_true_hdg 
18 0000XXfms2_grnd_spd 
19 0000XXfms2_lat 
20 0000XXfms2_lon 
21 0000XXfms2_pres_alt 
22 0000XXfms2_true_hdg 
23 0000XXfms2_trk_ang 
24 0000XXgps1_alt_msl 
25 0000XXgps1_lat 
26 0000XXgps1_lat_fine 
27 0000XXgps1_lon 
28 0000XXgps1_lon_fine 
29 0000XXgps1_trk_ang 
30 0000XXgps1_vert_spd 
31 0000XXgps2_alt_msl 
32 0000XXgps2_lat 
33 0000XXgps2_lat_fine 
34 0000XXgps2_lon 
35 0000XXgps2_lon_fine 
36 0000XXgps2_trk_ang 
37 0000XXgps2_vert_spd 
38 0000XXins1_body_lat_accel 
39 0000XXins1_body_lon_accel 
40 0000XXins1_body_normal_accel 
41 0000XXins1_e_w_velocity 
42 0000XXins1_grnd_spd 
43 0000XXins1_inert_vert_spd 
44 0000XXins1_inertial_alt 
 Appendix B-14 
45 0000XXins1_n_s_velocity 
46 0000XXins1_pitch_ang 
47 0000XXins1_platform_hdg 
48 0000XXins1_roll_ang 
49 0000XXins1_vertical_accel 
50 0000XXins2_body_lat_accel 
51 0000XXins2_body_lon_accel 
52 0000XXins2_body_normal_accel 
53 0000XXins2_e_w_velocity 
54 0000XXins2_grnd_spd 
55 0000XXins2_inert_vert_spd 
56 0000XXins2_inertial_alt 
57 0000XXins2_n_s_velocity 
58 0000XXins2_pitch_ang 
59 0000XXins2_platform_hdg 
60 0000XXins2_roll_ang 
61 0000XXins2_vertical_accel 
62 0000XXmonth 
63 0000XXmp_xacc 
64 0000XXmp_yacc 
65 0000XXmp_zacc 
66 0000XXtime_in_hrs 
67 0000XXtime_in_msec 
68 0000XXtime_in_secs 
69 0000XXyear 
70 0000XXzxt_alt_meter 
71 0000XXzxt_lat 
72 0000XXzxt_lon 
Where ‘XX’ is the G-III flight number (23,24,25,27,28)  
Source:  NASA G-III data files 
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Appendix C – Processed Data Structures 
 
 
The data collected during the CCA flight Demonstration was obtained from 4 sources, GIII 
Instrumentation, Proteus FMS, Ground Control Station, and Common Tool.  The two aircraft 
sources contained more parameters than were actually necessary to determine a ‘truth’ position 
for the aircraft and sensor performance.   
 
For the GIII intruder, several position parameters were evaluated to determine which one of the 
sources provided the most reliable and accurate measurement of latitude and longitude of the 
aircraft.  Although the ZXT source was expected to be more accurate, it was not available for all 
runs.  The GPS1 source had the best availability and was selected to provide the GIII ‘truth’ 
source.   
 
The Proteus FMS data had GPS and INS position data sources.  The GPS data, however, was not 
accurate and the INS source was initially selected even though it was a blended solution with 
possible position errors that were not well understood because of the proprietary CMIGITS II 
hardware.  A subsequent release of the raw GPS data from Scaled Composites resulted in a better 
GPS source and it was then selected to provide the ‘truth’ position data.  Since it was desirable to 
have both position sources from the same type of equipment, this data proved to be an important 
source.  Data is stored for the runs beginning at the time the autopilot was engaged and the 
ground pilot took control until aircraft control was returned to the aircraft. 
 
The ADS-B information was collected by the Proteus FMS.  GPS position data from a separate 
source that was part of the ADS-B hardware was available for both the host and intruder.  
Although up to three intruders could be tracked, the GIII data was consistently found in the 
Intruder 1 position. 
 
The TCAS information was also collected by the Proteus FMS.  TCAS data is in the form of a 
range and bearing that will be compared to range and bearing values calculated from the ‘truth’ 
position data.  As with the ADS-B, there are up to three tracks of TCAS data available but due to 
implementation on the Proteus and the presence of other aircraft in the area with TCAS 
equipment, the GIII data tended to change from one track to the other and sometimes was not 
available because three other aircraft were recorded.  This complicated processing of the TCAS 
data and in some cases made it impossible to determine TCAS range and bearing data for 
portions of a run. 
 
The GCS data contains much of the same data recorded on the Proteus aircraft.  Data latencies 
can be determined by observing the difference in time that the data was recorded on the aircraft 
and when it was recorded in the GCS.  Unfortunately, it appears that the time data in the GCS is 
not accurate enough (integer seconds only) to make the necessary comparisons.  Additionally, 
the GCS data was to be used as the source of the time of the pilot input when responding to a 
RA.  This data does not appear to be available at this time.  Scaled Composites is reviewing the 
data at this time. 
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The Common Tool data provides another measure of the collision avoidance timeline by 
indicating the time that the RA was displayed to the ground pilot.  Data is stored for the runtimes 
determined by the autopilot engagement times.  
 
Only data for Proteus Flights 369, 370, 374, and 375 and associated GCS, Common Tool, and 
GIII flights have been processed.  Flight 368 Proteus FMS data did not include an INS Time 
parameter to provide UTC timing for the data.  The run numbers in the database match the Scribe 
Notes runs except for Flight 369.  Cycling of the autopilot during Run 8 resulted in that run 
being identified as Runs 8, 9, 10.  Since that run was not selected for additional analysis due to 
system problems during the run, the error in run numbers was not corrected.  Subsequent runs on 
that flight are numbered incorrectly.  Due to a processing error, the data for the last four runs on 
the last flight were not included in the data submitted by Scaled Composites. 
 
All data has been interpolated as required or discrete values selected for UTC times at xx.0 and 
xx.5 in order to make comparisons of the data across multiple sources.    
 
Queries in each of the databases listed below were developed during data processing to verify 
that the processes were functioning properly.  In some case, the queries may no longer work as 
tables and table structures may have been modified. 
 
 
Flight Demo GCS v1.mdb 
Table Contents 
GCS_Run_Data Records for all runs from autopilot engage to disengage for the 
four processed flights.  Fields have been added for flight and run 
numbers and to translate the G16 timing used in the GCS to UTC 
time.  
RawGCSData_369 All raw data from the Scaled Composites data file for Flight 369 
RawGCSData_370 All raw data from the Scaled Composites data file for Flight 369 
RawGCSData_374 All raw data from the Scaled Composites data file for Flight 369 
RawGCSData_375 All raw data from the Scaled Composites data file for Flight 369 
 
 
Flight Demo GIII v2.mdb 
Table Contents 
000024GIII_Data_v1 Selected raw data from the NASA data file for Flight 24 flown 
during Proteus Flight 369.  Fields have been added for Flight, 
Run, and Time ID’s. 
000025GIII_Data_v1 Selected raw data from the NASA data file for Flight 24 flown 
during Proteus Flight 370. Fields have been added for Flight, 
Run, and Time ID’s. 
000027GIII_Data_v1 Selected raw data from the NASA data file for Flight 24 flown 
during Proteus Flight 374. Fields have been added for Flight, 
Run, and Time ID’s. 
000028GIII_Data_v1 Selected raw data from the NASA data file for Flight 24 flown 
during Proteus Flight 375. Fields have been added for Flight, 
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Run, and Time ID’s. 
Adjusted_GIII_All GPS Leading Edge data interpolated to xx.0 and xx.5 
APEngage Autopilot engage and disengage times for each of the runs.  Also 
provides a cross reference for the Proteus and GIII flight 
numbers 
GIII_Parameters Listing of the GIII parameters selected for upload to the 
database. 
Leading_Edge_GIII_All Selected records for the leading edge of all GPS data updates 
processed from the raw data. 
Run_Count Listing of the number of runs during each flight used for data 
processing tools developed to import Scaled Composites and 
NASA data files. 
Version Version control information indicating changes and additions. 
 
 
Flight Demo Proteus v2.mdb 
Table Contents 
Adjusted_GPS_Data GPS leading edge data interpolated to xx.0 and xx.5 
Adjusted_Proteus_All INS and other parameters interpolated to xx.0 and xx.5.  Data 
was extracted for INS leading edge and interpolated before raw 
GPS data was available. 
APEngage Autopilot engage and disengage times for each of the runs.  Also 
provides a cross reference for the Proteus and GIII flight 
numbers 
FMS_Channels Listing of the Proteus FMS parameters selected for upload to the 
database. 
FMS_Data Selected parameters of the raw FMS data for each of the runs 
from autopilot engage to disengage.  INS leading edge data was 
selected from these records 
Raw_GPS_Data Raw GPS data extracted for each run from autopilot engage to 
disengage.  Flight and Run ID’s added as well as GPS timing 
translated to UTC.  
Run_Count Listing of the number of runs during each flight used for data 
processing tools developed to import Scaled Composites and 
NASA data files. 
 
 
Flight Demo Pseudo TSPI v6.mdb 
This database contains tables imported from the GPS, Proteus, and GIII databases to be used 
during analysis.  It contains queries that simplify the process of matching the time stamps for the 
data. 
Table Contents 
Adjusted_ADSB_Leading_Edge ADS-B leading edge data interpolated to xx.0 and xx.5.  
Continuous parameters are interpolated as required and 
discreet values are for the later point used in the 
interpolation. 
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Adjusted_GIII_All GPS Leading Edge data interpolated to xx.0 and xx.5 
(duplicate data) 
Adjusted_GPS_Data GPS leading edge data interpolated to xx.0 and xx.5 
(duplicate data) 
Adjusted_Proteus_All INS and other parameters interpolated to xx.0 and xx.5.  
Data was extracted for INS leading edge and 
interpolated before raw GPS data was available. 
(duplicate data) 
Adjusted_TCAS_GIII_Leading_Edge TCAS leading edge data interpolated to xx.0 and xx.5.  
Continuous parameters are interpolated as required and 
discreet values are for the later point used in the 
interpolation. 
APEngage Autopilot engage and disengage times for each of the 
runs.  Also provides a cross reference for the Proteus and 
GIII flight numbers 
Version Version control information indicating changes and 
additions. 
 
 
Flight_Demo_Common_Tool v1.mdb 
Table Contents 
APEngage Autopilot engage and disengage times for each of the 
runs.  Also provides a cross reference for the Proteus and 
GIII flight numbers and the associated Lockheed Martin 
filenames for the Common Tool data where available. 
CommonTool_Flt_Demo_Data_369 Raw Common Tool data from autopilot engage to 
disengage collected from Proteus Flight 369.  Some runs 
did not have an associated file with data available. 
CommonTool_Flt_Demo_Data_370 Raw Common Tool data from autopilot engage to 
disengage collected from Proteus Flight 369.  Some runs 
did not have an associated file with data available. 
CommonTool_Flt_Demo_Data_374 Raw Common Tool data from autopilot engage to 
disengage collected from Proteus Flight 369.  Some runs 
did not have an associated file with data available. 
CommonTool_Flt_Demo_Data_375 Raw Common Tool data from autopilot engage to 
disengage collected from Proteus Flight 369.  Some runs 
did not have an associated file with data available. 
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